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OBJECTIVITY AND HABEAS CORPUS: 
SHOULD FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 
BE PERMITTED TO RULE UPON THE VALIDITY 
OF THEIR OWN CRIMINAL TRIAL CONDUCT? 
Marilyn L. Kelley* 
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was adopted in 1948 with the avowed 
purpose of providing an expeditious remedy for correcting errone-
ous federal sentences without resort to habeas corpus. 1 The major 
innovation of section 2255 is its jurisdictional limitation that "[a] 
prisoner ... may move the court which imposed the sentence to 
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. " 2 Prior to this enactment, 
the proper forum for federal prisoners seeking collateral review of 
their judgments of conviction was the district in which they were 
incarcerated. 3 But the tremendous burden placed upon the few 
federal judges sitting in those districts, 4 certain abuses of the writ 
of habeas corpus by petitioners;5 and the cost and inconvenience of 
requiring sentencing judges and assistant United States attorneys 
to appear as witnesses at habeas hearings in distant forums 6 led to 
the adoption of section 2255. Thereafter, only where the statutory 
remedy proved "inadequate or ineffective" to test the legality of 
the incarceration was a federal prisoner to be permitted to seek a 
writ of habeas corpus. 7 Commentators soon expressed fears that 
the new statute would impinge upon the right to the writ of habeas 
corpus, 8 and in 1950 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
section 2255 void as a suspension of the writ in violation of Article 
*Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University, College of Law. B.A., 1964, 
Michigan State University; J.D., 1971, Wayne State University; LL.M., 1975, Columbia 
University. 
This article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the J .S.D. degree, 
Columbia University. · 
'See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), Reviser's Note. 
228 U .s.c. § 2255 (1970). 
3See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952); Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 
(1948). 
4See Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, IO OHIO ST. L.J. 337 (1949). 
5See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 171-74 (1948). 
6 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 217 n.25. 
728 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) reads in part: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized 
to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it· 
appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court 
which sentenced him, or ·that such court has denied him relief, unless it also 
appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of 
his detention. 
8See, e.g., Note, Section 2255 of the Judicial Code: The Threatened Demise of Habeas 
Corpus, 59 YALE L,J. 1183 (1950). 
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I, § 9 of the Constitution.9 To avoid reaching this constitutional 
issue, the Supreme Court held that the statute is a complete substi-
tute for the constitutional right of habeas corpus, and that it main-
tains as broad a scope, procedurally and substantively, as that 
guaranteed by habeas corpus. 10 In construing section 2255, the 
Court declared that the statutory remedy does not impinge upon 
the right of habeas corpus, since it affords "the same rights in 
another and more convenient forum." 11 
On April 26, 1976, the Supreme Court prescribed rules to govern 
collateral proceedings in United States district courts brought by 
federal prisoners pursuant to section 2255 .12 Rule 4(a) provides 
that the motion to vacate shall be heard by the judge who presided 
at the movant's trial and sentenced him, or, if the judge who 
imposed sentence was not the trial judge, then it shall be heard by 
the judge who presided over that part of the proceedings being 
attacked by the movant. 13 Thus, rule 4(a) restricts the jurisdictional 
provision of section 2255 to refer to the specific judge who imposed 
sentence or who presided over that part of the criminal proceedings 
being collaterally attacked. The result is that the 2255 judge will 
now issue an order to show cause why petitioner is being incarcer-
ated when, in fact, it was that judge's own order, entered at.the 
criminal trial, that incarcerated the petitioner. 
Neither the legislative history nor the evils that section 2255 was 
intended to cure require the procedure imposed by rule 4(a). It 
should also be recognized that rule 4(a) goes further than the 
statutory language or the former practice of the federal courts. The 
statute only requires the petition to be filed in "the sentencing 
court," and while several of the circuit courts of appeals had 
interpreted "sentencing court" to mean "sentencing judge," 14 the 
9Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. g;anred; 341 U.S. 930 
(1951), vacated, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). 
U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2 reads, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it." 
10United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952). Accord, Hill v. United States, 368 
U.S. 424, 427 (1962). With this saving interpretation, hoped-for revisions in habeas proce-
dures were sacrificed. For example, the modified res judicata provision was subsequently 
considered to be declarative of the common law rule that res judicata may not apply to 
denials of relief on habeas corpus or on a motion to vacate. See Sanders v. United States, 
373 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1963). 
"United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219 (emphasis added). 
12Rules governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, Order 
of April 26, 1976, 96 S. Ct. at 7 (yellow pages) (1976). 
13/d. · 
14See Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782, 788 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022 
(1967), relying on United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 51-53 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 
U.S. 916 (1965); United States ex rel. Leguillou v: Davis, 212 F.2d 581,684 (3d Cir. 1954); 
Clark v. Memolo, 174 F.2d 978,982 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348, 
348-49 (4th Cir. 1949). Contra, Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270, 273-74 (1st Cir. 
1967). 
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sentencing judge may or may not have been the criminal trialjudge. 
Furthermore, in the event that the sentencing judge had also been 
the criminal trial judge, he was expected to recuse from the 2255 
proceeding where, for example, he was to be a witness, 15 or where 
his past knowledge might affect his independent judgment. 16 In 
contrast, rule 4(a) specifically requires the petition to go to the 
judge who presided over that part of the proceedings being at-
tacked (whether he be the sentencingjudge or some other) with no 
apparent discretion to recuse. 
Since rule 4(a) provides a procedure significantly different from 
common law habeas corpus and from previous 2255 practice, con-
sideration should be given to whether the rule provides an 
adequate basis for collateral review, or whether it impinges upon 
the right of petitioners to have the independent and impartial re-
view anticipated by the constitutional right of habeas corpus. 17 
In addition, a substantial question may be raised concerning the 
lack of administrative efficiency in following the procedure of rule 
4(a). Though rule 4(a) provides no exceptions to the same judge's 
presiding, statutory recusation requirements for bias or pre-
judice, 18 or for interest, 19 or for judges called as witnesses20 ought 
to be applicable to 2255 proceedings. Additional hearings would 
necessarily be required to resolve these issues before reaching the 
merits of the motion to vacate. Although these issues might be 
raised no matter which judge presides, it seems far more likely that 
they would be raised (perhaps even encouraged) where the crimi-
nal trial judge presides over the subsequent 2255 hearing. It is also 
likely that the presiding judge would have personal knowledge of 
the events challenged collaterally and thus would frequently be 
15See United States v. Valentino. 283 F.2d 634, 636 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. 
Halley, 240 F.2d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 967 (1957). 
16See United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141, 1143 (5th Cir. 1973); Battaglia v. United 
States, 390 F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1968). 
17 Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217,224 
(1969); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 (1963); Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 181 
(1906); Cross v. Burke, 146 U.S. 82, 88 (1892); Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U.S. 104, 113 
(1889); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 494 (1885). It is independent of the criminal proceed-
ing. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 224; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 311-12; 
Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1923); Ex pa rte Tom Tong, I 08 U.S. 556, 559 (1883). 
The question of illegal incarceration is to be considered independently of any question of 
guilt, and entitlement to challenge illegal incarceration is not contingent upon proving one's 
innocence. Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. at 559. This notion merely expresses that a person 
should not be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law and that guilt or 
innocence has no bearing upon this determination. But see Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 
3050 (1976). 
1828 U.S.C. § 144 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(I) (Supp. V 1975). 
1928 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V 1975). See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
2028 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) and (b)(5)(iv) (Supp. V 1975). 
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called as a witness. 21 Where the 2255 judge erroneously elects not 
to disqualify himself from hearing the petition, the entire proceed-
ings before that judge would be reversed and assigned to a different 
judge to hear all over again. 22 
These problems are unnecessary since the jurisdictional limita-
tion of section 2255 does not require the same judge to preside, nor 
has the statute ever been so interpreted. 23 It is the purpose of this 
article to explore the consequences that rule 4(a) engenders by 
requiring the criminal trial judge to preside over the collateral 
attack and to rule upon the validity of his own work product. 
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 2255 
At common law, the habeas judge could not examine a convic-
tion for any purpose other than to verify that the committing court 
had jurisdiction to try the matter. 24 This limited use of habeas 
corpus, adopted into the United States Constitution, was viewed as 
a privilege that extended only to federal court prisoners. 25 In 1867, 
however, Congress granted to prisoners detained by authority of 
state courts the right to seek habeas corpus in federal district 
courts. 26 More significantly, Congress provided an expansive sub-
ject matter jurisdiction clause permitting state court prisoners to 
21 See Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965), where the original trial judge, 
after refusing to entertain the motion and being reversed, see Juelich v. United States, 300 
F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1962), and after refusing to produce petitioner at the subsequent required 
hearing and being reversed, see Juelich v. United States, 316 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1963) (per 
curiam), finally recused upon motion by the petitioner because the petitioner intended to call 
the judge as a witness. 342 F.2d at 3 J. By then, more than a year had elapsed from the first 
hearing required after reversal until the second subsequent hearing before a different judge. 
Id. at 30, 31. See also, United States v. Valentino, 283 F.2d 634,636 (2d Cir. 1960); United 
States v. Halley, 240 F.2d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 967 (1957). 
22See Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270, 272-74 (1st Cir. 1967). See also, Battaglia v. 
United States, 390 F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1968). 
23The procedure has simply been viewed as "highly desirable." Carvell v. United States, 
173 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949). 
24See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830), where Chief Justice Marshall 
wrote: 
The judgment of a court of record whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on all 
the world as the judgment of this court would be .... [A]n imprisonment under a 
judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is 
not a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be 
erroneous. 
See generally, Cohen, Some Considerations on the Origins of Habeas Corpus, 16 CAN. B. 
REV. 92 (1938); Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa -The Emergence of the Modern Writ 
-/, 18 CAN. B. REV. 10 (1940); Jenks, The Story of the Habeas Corpus, 18 LAW Q. REv. 64 
(1902). 
••see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 499 (1953); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200,221 (1950) 
(dissenting opinion). 
26Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § I, 14 Stat. 385 (now 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970)). 
48 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:44 
raise not only jurisdictio~al claims but also -federal constitutional 
and statutory claims. 27 Subsequently, this statutory provision was 
construed to apply to federal criminal adjudications as well, 28 
thereby expanding the issues subject to collateral attack by federal 
prisoners. In addition, habeas corpus was made available to chal-
lenge matters dehors the record. 29 This extension of habeas review 
to include deprivation of constitutional rights, even those not of 
record, was made without adequate procedural controls. The in-
evitable result was a dramatic increase in habeas litigation, 30 much 
of it without merit. 31 For example, habeas proceedings could be 
invoked merely by petitioner's oath that the judgment was in 
violation of his constitutional rights. 32 Since matters not contained 
in the record could be asserted, much time and expense were 
involved in bringing witnesses from a distant forum to testify with 
respect to those matters. Even where records and files were avail-
able, they were located, more often than not, in a district other 
than the one in which the petition was filed; therefore, much time 
27/d. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 reads in part that the privilege of the Writ shall 
extend to "all cases where any person may be re·strained of his or her liberty in violation of 
the constitution .... " 
28See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217,221 (1969). Prior to the Kaufman decision, 
the development of the right of federal prisoners to challenge deprivation of constitutional 
rights had been hindered by contorted attempts to fit constitutional violations into the 
stringent test of "void for lack of jurisdiction." In 1879, the Supreme Court had expanded 
the definition of l,ack of jurisdiction to include unconstitutional acts of Congress. A convic-
tion resting upon an unconstitutional statute was considered null and void since the trial 
court really acquired no jurisdiction of the cause. See Ex parte Siebold, JOO U.S. 371, 376 
(1879). In 1938, the Supreme Court again found a jurisdictional bar to a conviction based 
upon failure to appoint counsel where there was no showing that there had been intelligent 
waiverof that right. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In 1942, the Supreme Court 
held that an allegation of a coerced guilty plea could be challenged on habeas corpus. The 
Court stated that 
the use of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a 
conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment of convic-
tion is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It extends also to 
those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitu-
tional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of 
preserving his rights. 
Waley v.Johnston,316 U.S. IOI, 104-05 (1942). After Waley, federal district courts applied 
this standard on a case-by-case basis, rejecting certain constitutional claims as not cogniza-
ble on habeas corpus. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 2171 220, 220 n.3. In 
Kaufman, the Court held that deprivation of all constitutional rights, even those rendered by 
courts of competent jurisdiction, may be challeilgecton habeas corpus. Id. at 221, 223, 231. 
The Court relied directly upon the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 for this interpretation. Id. at 
221. 
29See House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945) (state prisoner); United States ex rel. 
McCann v. Adams, 320 U.S. 220, 22 I (1943) (federal prisoner); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 
IOI, 104 (1942) (federal prisoner); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466 (1938) (federal 
.prisoner); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, I 12 (1935) (per curiam) (state prisoner) 
(dictum); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923) (state prisoner). 
30See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212, 212 n.13 (1952). See also Speck, supra 
note 4. 
31See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 212, 212 n.14. 
32See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 283 (1941). 
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and expense were involved in ordering and producing them. 
Habeas corpus procedure was also complicated by the common 
law rule that resjudicata is not applicable to issues raised in habeas 
corpus proceedings,33 permitting habeas litigation to be renewed 
any number of times, and thereby increasing the burden of trans-
ferring records and requiring witnesses to appear in distant forums. 
Finally, the ever-expanding notion of due process has provided 
innumerable issues potentially cognizable in habeas proceedings, 
likewise increasing the burden of habeas litigation, and the transfer 
of records and appearance of witnesses. 
In response to these problems, the Judicial Conference of the 
United States appointed a committee, chaired by Chief Judge 
Parker of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to examine 
and recommend changes in the habeas procedures. 34 In 1944, the 
Conference submitted two bills to Congress to revise habeas cor-
pus procedures for both state and federal petitioners. 35 With re-
spect to federal petitioners, the most significant proposal con-
cerned a change in the appropriate forum for hearing collateral 
petitions.36 In a statement prepared by Circuit Judge Stone and 
submitted to Congress by the Conference,37 the proposed jurisdic-
tional bill was described as follows: 
This section applies only to Federal sentences. It creates a 
statutory remedy consisting of a motion before the court where 
the movant has been convicted. The remedy is in the nature 9f, 
but much broader than, coram nobis. The motion remedy 
broadly covers all situations where the sentence is "open to 
collateral attack." As a remedy, it is intended to be as broad as 
habeas corpus. 38 
Judge Stone's statement also explained the problems that the 
jurisdictional bill was intended to remedy: 
Most habeas corpus cases raise fact issues involving the trial 
occurrences or the alleged actions of judges, United States 
attorneys, marshals or other court officials. Obviously, it in-
volves interruption of judicial duties 1f the trial Judge, the U-
nited States attorney, the court clerk or the marshal . . . [is] 
required to attend the habeas corpus hearing as [a witness]. 
Such attendance is sometimes necessary to refute particular 
33See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 7-15 (1963); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. i24, 
230 (1924); Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 240-41 (1924). For a critique of this 
rule, se~ Kelley, Finality and Habeas Corpus: ls the Rule that Resludicata May Not Apply 
to Habeas Corpus or Motion to Vacate Still Viable?, 78 W. VA. L. REV. I (1975). 
34See 1942 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 18. 
35See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1952). 
36See 1943 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 22-24. 
37See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 215-17 (1952). 
38/d. at 216-17. 
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testimony which the prisoner may give and, obviously, such 
attendance is the safest course. This is so because experience 
has demonstrated that often petitioner will testify to anything he 
may think useful, however false; and, without the witnesses 
present to refute such, he is encouraged to do so and may make 
out a case for discharge from merited puishment. 39 
While the proposed bills of the Judicial Conference were pend-
ing, the Committee on Revision of the Laws of the House of 
Representatives drafted a bill revising the entire Judicial Code. 40 
Portions were drafted in conformity with the bills of the Judicial 
Conference, in particular, the jurisdictional bill affecting federal 
habeas corpus petitioners.41 
Subsequent to the revision of the Judicial Code, Judge Parker 
wrote an article42 listing the major abuses of the writ and giving his 
impression of what the new legislation was intended to accomplish. 
He asserted that the former procedure provided no opportunity for 
the trial judge to supplement the record or to furnish a statement of 
what had occurred at trial; that if heard, the trial judge was re-
quired to be heard in the capacity of an ordinary witness; and that 
this practice resulted in the "unseemly spectacle of federal district 
courts trying the regularity of proceedings had in courts of coordi-
nate jurisdiction .... " 43 Judge Parker believed that the new stat-
ute would resolve these problems, and noted that "in the case of 
federal prisoners, provision is made for relief by motion before the 
sentencing judge and right to habeas corpus in such cases is greatly 
limited .... " 44 
Nothing in the legislative history, however, suggests that the 
petition should be filed before the very judge who tried and sen-
tenced the petitioner. In fact, the precise argument presented to 
Congress for the necessity of enacting the jurisdictional bill was to 
permit trial judges to appear as witnesses in their own districts for 
the sake of convenience. 45 
Shortly after the adoption of section 2255, in Carvell v. United 
States, 46 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered 
the propriety of the criminal trial judge's presiding at the hearing of 
a motion brought pursuant to section 2255 to vacate his own prior 
39/d. at 217 n.25. 
40/d. at 218. 
41/d. 
42See Parker, supra note 5. 
43/d. at 172-73. 
44/d. at 174 (emphasis added). The notion that the criminal trial j~dge is th~ ap!'ropriate 
judge to preside at the collateral hearing attacking the validity of his own pnor Judgment 
appears to have been conceived in this article. _ 
45See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 217 n.25 (1952). 
46 17_3 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949). 
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sentence. In a per curiam opinion, in which Chief Judge Parker 
participated, the court ruled that: 
Not only was there no impropriety in this, but it is highly 
desirable in such cases that the motions be passed on by the 
judge who is familiar with the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the trial, and is consequently not likely to be misled by 
false allegations as to what occurred. It was to avoid the un-
seemly practice of having attacks upon the regularity of trials 
made before another judge through resort to habeas corpus that 
section 2255 of Title 28 was inserted in the Judicial Code.47 
Since Judge Parker was chairman of the committee appointed by 
the Judicial Conference to study the problems of habeas litigation 
and to make recommendations for correcting those problems, 
much deference has been accorded to this opinion in the belief that 
it represents Judge Parker's understanding of section 2255 and that 
it is good evidence of the legislative intent. 48 Only the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit has taken issue with this statement of 
statutory purpose. 49 
It has already been suggested that one of the main purposes of 
section 2255 was to provide a convenient forum in which the trial 
judge might testify, if necessary. That purpose is, obviously, con-
trary to the interpretation rendered in Carvell. 
Beyond this inconsistency, Carvell suggests two significant is-
sues: first, that it is highly desirable that the motions be passed 
upon by the judge who is familiar with the facts; and second, that 
the criminal trial judge is not likely to be misled by allegations in 
the 2255 petition as to what had occurred. The first issue raises the 
question of the proper function of the 2255 judge. Since Carvell 
was decided before the landmark decision of Townsend v. Sain 50 
(which set forth explicit criteria mandating factfinding by the 
habeas judge), it is appropriate to reconsider the validity of the 
rationale that there is no impropriety in permitting the judge who 
tried the criminal case to preside over a 2255 evidentiary hearing 
attacking the validity of that trial. The second issue raises by 
implication the question of the propriety of the ·trial judge's acting as 
both witness and trier of fact in the same proceeding. These issues 
47/d. at 348-49. 
48See Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782, 788 (2d Cir. 1976), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1022 
(1967), relying on United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 51-53 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,381 
U.S. 916 (1965); United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681,684 (3d Cir. 1954); 
Clark v. Memolo, 174 F.2d 978, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
••see Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270, 273 (1st Cir. 1967), where the court said 
""[W]e find nothing ... to indicate that ·court' was used in the restrictive sense of a specific 
judge." 
so372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
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should be considered in light of the functions and discretionary 
powers of the 2255 judge. 
II. THE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE 2255 JUDGE 
A. Fact.finding: The Townsend Guidelines 
The statute of 186751 enlarged the habeas court's functions to 
include the power to order evidentiary hearings and to "try the 
facts anew. " 52 In Townsend v. Sain, 53 the Supreme Court asserted 
that evidentiary hearings are mandatory where: 
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the 
state hearing; 
(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the 
record as a whole; 
(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was 
not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; 
(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evi-
dence; 
(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the 
state-court hearing; or 
(6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not 
afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. 54 
All of these guidelines (except the third) have been held applicable 
to section 2255 proceedings. 55 Reading these guidelines in light of 
the procedure required by rule 4(a), it is doubtful that a 2255 review 
· will be more than pro forma. Can the same judge determine objec-
tively his own fairness and completeness in the criminal proceed-
ings, particularly where the 2255 judge's ruling will be based upon 
his own subsequent factfinding and where the adequacy of that 
factfinding will thereafter be subject only to limited appellate re-
view? · 
51 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. 
52Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466 
(1938). The Act of 1867 reads in part: "[T]he said court or judge shall proceed in a summary 
way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing testimony and the arguments of the parties 
interested .... " 
53372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
541d. at 313. Even the dissent agreed that the district court had the power to receive 
evidence and try the facts anew. Id. at 326 (Stewart dissenting, with whom Justices Clark, 
Harlan and White joined). Moreover, the dissent agreed that "[w]here the facts are Ml 
dispute, the federal court ... must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did 
not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court .... " Id. at 327. 
""See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 (1969), where the Court said that 
"only the duty of the federal habeas court to scrutinize 'the fact-finding procedure' under (3) 
does not apply in the case of a federal prisoner; federal factfinding procedures are by 
hypothesis adequate to assure the integrity of the underlying constitutional rights." 
FALL 1976] Objectivity and Habeas Corpus 53 
It seems unlikely that such a review will be adequate to insure 
the underlying integrity of the prior criminal proceeding. This 
problem is well demonstrated in McDonald v. United States, 56 
where the trial judge who originally took petitioner's guilty plea 
dismissed a subsequent motion to vacate without a hearing, even 
though petitioner had alleged his own mental incompetence at the 
time he entered the guilty plea.57 The dismissal was reversed on 
appeal, and the case remanded with a direction to the trial judge to 
hold an evidentiary hearing. 58 The 2255 judge then held the ob-
ligatory hearing, made a finding that petitioner was competent at 
the time his plea was entered, and again dismissed the motion.59 
On appeal, the judgment was affirmed for the reason that "the trial 
court's findings are well supported by the evidence and they are 
conclusively binding here. " 60 The net result of this procedure is 
that it permits the trial judge to find as true those facts which 
support his own prior ruling. 
B. Discretionary Powers 
A conviction carries with it the presumption of regularity, 61 and 
the burden of proving its irregularity rests upon the petitioner.62 
While a motion to vacate under section 2255 is a civil proceeding,63 
requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence,64 the burden 
of proving irregularity apparently may increase simply by the pas-
sage of time from the entry of sentence to the filing of a motion. 65 
Even where evidence is undisputed, the court may choose to 
disbelieve the petitioner's evidence,66 and that disbelief may be 
56341 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1965), dlsmissal affd on remand, 356 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1966) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 936 (1966). 
57/d. at 378. 
said. 
59See McDonald v. United States, 356 F.2d 980, 981 (10th Cir. 1966) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 936 (1966). 
60/d. at 982. 
61 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938); Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 280, 286 
(1889); Hilliard v. United States, 345 F.2d 252, 255 (10th Cir. 1965) (presumption of validity); 
Simpson v. United States, 342 F.2d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1965) (presumption that the court 
acted reasonably). 
62See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938). 
63See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217,224 (1969), quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 
U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963). 
64See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 469. 
65See United States v. Forlano, 212 F. Supp. 77, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd on other 
grounds, 319 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Wiggins, 184 F..Supp. 673, 676 
(D.D.C 1960); United States v. Edwards, 152 F. Supp. 179, 183 (D.D.C 1975), ajf'd, 
256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
66See Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271,_ 279 (1945). 
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based upon the mere passage of time, 67 leading the court to find 
that the petition "lacks merit" 68 or that it lacks "good faith and 
credibility.' ' 69 
The 2255 judge is empowered to make value judgments concern-
ing petitioner's motion, 70 and relying upon those judgments, to 
grant or deny varied forms of assistance to petitioner in challenging 
the conviction. 71 The judge may, for example, find the petition 
factually insufficient on its face 72 and summarily dismiss it, 73 with-
out requiring the Government to respond. 74 The court may permit 
67See Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 531 (4th Cir. 1970) (The delay in filing merits 
consideration.); Morse v. United States, 304 F.2d 876, 877 (8th Cir. 1962) (per curiam) (A 
claim filed at such a late date was "suspect."); Malone v. United States, 299 F.2d 254, 256 
(6th Cir. 1962) (The failure to assert a claim earlier "raises a strong inference of invalidity.); 
Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d 582, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (The burden of proof was 
magnified by the lapse of time.); United States v. Lowe, 173 F.2d 346,347 (2d Cir. 1949) 
(The allegations were considered a "mere afterthought."); Daughtry v. United States, 242 
F. Supp. 771, 774 (E.D.N.C. 1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 
U.S. 965 (1966) (The allegations might have credence, but were adduced only after trial and 
sentence; therefore,- they were considered "self-serving."). Contra, Sturrup v. United 
States, 218 F. Supp. 279,281 (E.D.N.C. 1963); Allen v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 866, 869 
(N.D. Ill. 1952), where the court stated, "No aging process, whereby a void judgment 
improves as to stature and validity by the passage of time, can properly be interposed." 
68LaClair v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 819, 824 (N :D. Ind. 1965) . 
. 
69Ailcen v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 43, 50 (M.D.N.C. 1961), aff'd, 296 F.2d 604 
(4th Cir. 1961). . 
10See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 21 (1963), where the Court said that "the 
sentencing court has discretion to ascertain whether the claim is substantial before granting 
a full evidentiary hearing." See also Johnson v. United States, 239 F.2d 698,699 (6th Cir. 
1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1956), where the court asserted, in affirming the denial of 
an evidentiary hearing, "[W]e calJJ)ot believe that the Supreme Court intended in its care for 
the protection of human liberty to impose upon the inferior courts the duty of recalling, 
years after action in criminal cases, prisoners for rehearings based on obviously nebulous and 
false accusations." 
71See Malone v. United States, 299 F.2d 254, 255-56 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 
863 (1962) where the court said: 
It is not the law that in every case where the movant may set forth a claim which 
appears to be good on paper although manifestly false in fact and frivolous, the 
District Court is nevertheless obliged to grant him an oral hearing .... 
It is necessary that the movant substantiate his conclusions by allegations of fact 
with some probability of verity. 
See also United States v. Mathison, 256 F.2d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 1958) (petition requires more 
than "wild and unsupported charges"); Nemirka v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 463, 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (not entitled to a hearing if the assertion is "incredible"). 
72See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 19 (1963); Aeby v. United States, 409 F.2d I, 2 
(5th Cir. 1969) (allegation of prejudicial remarks was a "mere conclusion"); Benthiem v. 
UnitedStates,403 F.2d 1009, 1011, 1011 n.5(lstCir.1968),cert.denied, 396U.S.945(1969) 
(specificity of fact required to justify furnishing petitioner a transcript); United States v. 
Lowe, 367 F.2d 44, 45-46 (7th Cir. 1966) (allegation that petitioner pleaded guilty because of 
"threats and promises" held too vague to require inquiry); Hammond v. United States, 309 
F.2d 935, 936 (4th Cir. 1962) (per curiam) (petitioner's allegation of knowing use of perjured 
testimony legally insufficient, so summary dismissal not error). 
73See Wilkins v. United States, 258 F.2d 416,417 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cited with approval by 
the Supreme Court in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 19 (1963), though the Court 
noted that "the better course might have been to direct petitioner to amend his motion .... " 
See also Stephens v. United States, 246 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1957) (per curiam). 
74See Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529 (4th Cir. 1970); Conway v. California 
Adult Auth., 396 U.S. 107, 109-10 (1969) (per curiam). See also Rule 3(b) governing 2255 
Proceedings, 96 S. Ct. 27 (yellow pages) (1976). 
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petitioner to amend his petition to set forth facts more specifically 
in order to avoid dismissal,75 but it is not error to deny the oppor-
tunity to amend and to dismiss summarily. 76 The court may dismiss 
a petition, moreover, upon the value judgment that petitioner 
probably has no set of facts other than un~upported conclusions to 
demonstrate his entitlement to a hearing. 77 
It is well-recognized that lay people, not adept at pleading and 
unaware of the significance of pleading particular facts, may plead 
conclusory allegations that are insufficient on their face. Because 
of this, district courts have been admonished to construe pleadings 
liberally. 78 Yet, permitting amendment of conclusory allegations is 
discretionary and, since the statute permits successive similar ap-
plications, 79 courts frequently dismiss rather than permit amend-
ment, noting that the dismissal is without prejudice to the bringing 
of a subsequent petition.80 This is unfortunate not only because it 
wastes time and encourages repetitious applications, but also be-
cause it subjects the petitioner to the discretionary power of the 
court to dismiss a second or successive petition seeking similar 
relief.81 This should not be; dismissal for insufficient pleadings is 
not a dismissal on the merits.82 Nonetheless, courts become impa-
tient,83 and petitioners get caught in the maze of rules and dis-
cretionary powers of the courts. Thus conclusory pleadings result 
in dismissal; subsequent and belated pleadings of fact pecome 
"suspect, " 84 magnifying petitioner's burden of proof. 85 The 
petitioner may then be required to demonstrate that his belated 
pleadings are not "an abuse of the writ or motion remedy. " 86 
75See Stephens v. United States, 246 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1957) (per curiam). 
1s1d. 
77United States v. Mathison, 256 F.2d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 1958). 
78Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 22 (1963), where the Court stated that "[a]n 
applicant ... ought not to be held to the niceties of lawyers' pleadings .... " 
7928 U .S.C. § 2255 (1970), which reads in part "[a] motion for such relief may be made at 
any time." This has been interpreted to mean that "as in habeas corpus, there is no statute 
of limitations, no res judicata, and that the doctrine of !aches is inapplicable." Heflin v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420 (1959) (concurring opinion). 
""See, e.g., Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526,531,531 n.5 (4th Cir. 1970); Aeby v. 
United States, 409 F.2d I, 2 (5th Cir. 1969); Oliver v. United States, 398 F.2d 353, 355-56, 
356 n.5 (9th Cir. I 968). 
81 28 U .S.C. § 2255 (1970), reads in part: "The sentencing court shall not be required to 
entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." 
82Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 19 (1963). 
83See Martinez v. United States, 344 F.2d 325, 326 (10th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), where the 
court said in discu'ssing petitioner's motion that it "def[ied] intelligent analysis"; Heisler v. 
United States, 321 F.2d 641, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1963), where the court said in dismissing 
petitioner's motion and denying him an opportunity to amend, -"If this be appellant's 
meaning. however. in our judgment it is not demanding too much of him to ask that he take 
the responsibility of coming right out and saying so in a recital of facts .... " 
"'Morse v. United States, 304 F.2d 876, 877 (8th Cir. l962) (per-curiam). 
85See Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d 582, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1955). 
86Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 17 (1963). It should be noted that in Sanders the 
Court placed the burden of pleading abuse of the writ on the Government. Id. at 17. Under 
rule 9(a) governing § 2255 proceedings, however, the burden appears to be shifted to the 
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Ultimately, the court may simply make the value judgment that 
petitioner must surely have known of the significance of the facts 
belatedly pleaded and therefore dismiss his petition87 (for inten-
tionally splitting his cause of action88 or for vexing, harassing, and 
delaying89 the court's administration) without ever deciding the 
merits. 
The 2255 court has discretion to appoint counsel,90 and may do 
so upon a conclusion that the petition is not frivolous. 91 Yet it is 
very likely that a petition will appear frivolous due to petitioner's 
inability. to plead his own cause effectively, which only demon-
strates the need for professional assistance in preparing his peti-
tion. 92 
The court also has discretion to grant or deny a transcript to a 
petitioner.93 While many claims may not be based upon occur-
rences that would appear in a transcript, denial of a transcript 
requires petitioner to plead matters to the best of his recollection, 
and thus he may fail to raise all claims known to him. Again, an 
initial failure to raise all claims subjects petitioner to the discretion-
petitioner. In fact, a delay of more than five years in filing a motion creates a presumption 
that there is prejudice to the Government. Rule 9(a) permits the court to dismiss a delayed 
petition upon a finding of prejudice to the Government, and rule 9(b) permits the court to 
dismiss a successive motion where the court finds that failure to assert the subsequent claim 
in a prior motion is not excusable. 
87See Hilbrich v. United States, 406 F.2d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 1969). 
""See Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 241 (1924). 
89See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963). 
• 0see Ford v. United States, 363 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Thomas v. United 
States, 308 F.2d 369, 371 (7th Cir. 1962). Formerly, even where an evidentiary hearing was 
required under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), or Sanders v. United States, 373 
U.S. I (1963), it was still within the trial court's discretion to refuse appointment of counsel. 
See Cates v. Ciccone, 422 F.2d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 1970) (dictum). But see Campbell v. United 
States, 318 F.2d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 1963). Rule 8(c) governing 2255 proceedings now requires 
appointment of counsel where an evidentiary hearing is required; and rule 6(a) requires 
appointment of counsel where discovery is necessary; otherwise, the rules leave untouched 
the trial court's discretionary power to appoint counsel. 
••see Farrar v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 264, 268 (W.D. Wis. 1964) (no counsel where 
petition is "completely groundless or utterly and hopelessly frivolous" quoting Cerniglia v. 
United States, 230 F. Supp. 932, 936 (N.D. Ill. 1964)), aff'd sub nom. United States v. 
Farrar, 346 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1965); Jackson v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 53, 57 (N.D. 
Tex. 1964) (no counsel where petition has "no possible merit"), aff'd, 339 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 
1964) (per curiam). 
92See Taylor v. United States, 221 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1955) (per curiam), where 
petitioner's motion was dismissed for failure to plead the word "knowing" in his allegation 
of perjured testimony. 
93See United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1976); Benthiem v. United States, 403 
F.2d 1009, 1011, 1011 n.4 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 945 (1969) (awarding of a 
transcript is not automatic); Rakes v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 812, 816 (W.D. Va. 1964), 
aff'd, 352 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), where the court said in denying petitioner's 
request for a transcript: 
The petitioner is not entitled to a transcript at government expense in order that he 
might search the record for error .... Rakes ... states as his reason for request-
ing the transcript ... that he wishe[s] to amend his petition after he receives a copy 
of the transcript. Clearly, the petitioner lacks faith in the allegations he has made in 
his petition and hopes to find something in the transcript to bolster his petition. 
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ary power of the court to dismiss his subsequent petition for 
splitting his claims. 94 
The court has the further discretion to grant or deny leave to 
appeal in forma pau·peris from a ruling adverse to petitioner. 95 
Denial of leave to appeal in forma pauperis is based upon the trial 
judge's certification that the petition is without merit and not taken 
in good faith. 96 This denial may thus foreclose review on the simple 
ground that there was no abuse of discretion in denying an appeal 
in forma pauperis.97 
The court also has discretion to determine whether a claim is 
"substantial" before granting a full evidentiary hearing. 98 Thus 
even when not required under the Townsend guidelines, the court 
may choose to grant an evidentiary hearing whenever it believes 
the claims are substantial or meritorious.99 Where the court deter-
mines that a hearing will be granted, it has the further discretion to 
determine whether petitioner's presence will be ordered; 100 
whether counsel will be appointed; 101 whether certain witnesses 
will be subpoenaed; 102 whether continuances will be granted103 or 
94See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 9-10, 22 (1963).• 
95See Turner v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Mo. 1962), appeal dismissed, 325 
F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1964). 
·
96/d. at 261. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l970). 
91See Turner v. United States, 206 F. Supp. at 261. 
98See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 21 (1963). Compare Turner v. United States, 
271 F.2d 855, 856 (8th Cir. 1959) (per curiam), where petitioner's claimed denial of effective 
assistance of counsel was dismissed as a "self-serving unsupported arid belated declaration 
.... " with United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952), where the Court said that 
"where ... ·there are substantial issues of fact as to events in which the prisoner partici-
pated, the trial court should require his production for a hearing.", and Walker v. Johnston, 
312 U.S. 275, 287 (1941), where the Court said "[t]he Government's contention that his 
allegations are improbable and unbelievable cannot serve to deny him an opportunity to 
support them by evidence.", and Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487,495 (1962), 
where the Court said, "We cannot agree with the Government that a hearing ... would be 
futile because of the apparent lack of any eyewitnesses to the occurrences alleged, other 
than the petitioner himself and the Assistant Uriited States Attorney." (emphasis added). 
99See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963). See also Johnson v. United States, 239 
F.2d 698, 699 (6th Cir. 1956) (per curiam), cert denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1956), where the court 
in affirming the denial of petitioner's motion said, "His allegations seem to follow a pattern 
which has become prevalent to enable convicts under long-time sentences to obtain vaca-
tions from imprisonment by trumped-up charges against their attorneys and court officials, 
even including district judges." . . 
• 00See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487,495 (1962); United States v. Hayman, 
342 U.S. 205, 222-23 (1952). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). 
• 01 See Day v. United States, 428 F.2d I 193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1970) (appointment of counsel 
discretionary, and not constitutionally required); Ford v. United States, 363 F.2d 437 (5th 
Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Thomas v. United States, 308 F.2d 369, 371 (7th Cir. 1962). There is 
no longer any discretion where an evidentiary hearing is required, see rule S(c) governing 
2255 proceedings, or where discovery is necessary, see rule 6(a) governing 2255 proceed-
ings, 
102See Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 73 (1895) (criminal trial); Bistram v. United 
States, 248 F.2d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1957) (2255 proceeding). 
103See Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 72 (1895) (criminal trial); Johnston v. 
United States, 292 F.2d 51, 53 (10th Cir. 1961) (2255 proceeding). 
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discovery permitted; 104 whether evidence will be taken by oral 
testimony, affidavits, 105 or depositions; 106 and further, which rules 
of procedure (civil or criminal) will govern the proceedings. 107 
Finally, trial courts are placed in the position not only of protect-
ing the criminal judgments (which have a presumption of validity 
and are not lightly set aside)108 but also of protecting counsel who 
are under attack for incompetency .109 This protective position of 
the court certainly makes the preponderance-of-the-evidence test a 
heavier requirement than in other civil proceedings. When it is the 
same judge presiding, who may wish to protect a conviction which 
he believes to have been fairly proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and who, having heard the evidence, is convinced of petitioner's 
guilt, he may find it difficult to view petitioner's claims objectively 
and independently of the prior criminal proceeding.U 0 He may, in 
his desire to protect the judgment, exercise his discretionary and 
evaluative powers to diminish petitioner's ability to mount a suc-
cessful attack, or to enhance the judgment's chances of surviving 
the attack. 
This exercise of discretionary powers may not constitute overt 
bias or prejudice sufficient to require statutory recusation, 111 but it 
may destroy the independence and.objectivity contemplated by the 
right to the writ of habeas corpus. 112 The basic concern must be 
104Rule 6(c) governing 2255 proceedings provides in part that "[a) party may invoke ... 
discovery ... if, and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for 
good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise." 
105See Phillips v. United States, 533 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. United 
States, 239 F.2d 698, ff)9 (6th Cir. 1956) (per curiam), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1956). 
106See Kimbrough v. United States, 226 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1955). 
107Rule 12 governing 2255 proceedings p~ovides that: 
If no procedure is specifically prescribed by these rules, the district court may 
proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules, or any applicable 
statute, and may apply the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, whichever it deems most appropriate, to motions filed 
under these rules. 
108See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938); Scherk v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 
445,447 (N.D. Cal. 1965), afj'd sub nom. Scherck v. United States, 354 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 
1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 882 (1965); United States v. Calp, 83 F. Supp. 152, 
156 (D. Md. 1949). 
109See Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75, 79 (5th Cir. 1%6), where the court said: "It is not 
counsel who is on trial."; Scherk v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 445, 450 (N .D. Cal. 1965), 
afj'd sub nom. Scherck v. United States, 354 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 382 U.S. 882 (1965); United States v. Edwards, 152 F. Supp. 179, 185 (D.D.C. 1957), 
aff'd, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1958), where the district court said, "[T)he courts are equally 
bound to protect members of the bar appearing before them against unjust and unwarranted 
attacks." See also id. at 186. 
110See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 239 F.2d 698,699 (Gth Cir. 1956) (percuriam), cert. 
denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1956), where the court in affirming the denial of petitioner's motion 
referred to the district judge's written order, which asserted "his conviction that [petitioner) 
had been fairly tried, was ably represented by highly experienced counsel, and that the judge 
was convinced of [petitioner's) guilt .... " 
'"See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). 
'
12See _notes 288-96 and accompanying text infra. 
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whether permitting a 2255 judge to exercise these discretionary 
powers in order to control the extent of review of his own prior 
criminal trial conduct provides an adequate collateral ·review. 
C. Limited Appellate Review 
Where the motion to vacate is ineffective to test the validity of 
the judgment, one may theoretically seek a writ of habeas corpus 
before a differentjudge.11 3 This right is merely theoretical. 114 Since 
the Supreme Court decided in United States v. Hayman 115 that 
section 2255 is a complete substitute for habeas corpus, 116 section 
2255 has been treated as the exclusive remedy for petitioners 
seeking to attack their convictions collaterally. 11 7 Thus, the sole 
remedy for denial of relief under section 2255 is by appeal, 118 not 
by petition for writ of habeas corpus. 119 
Refusal of the 2255 judge to exercise his discretionary powers is 
reversible on appeal only for abuse of discretion, 120 and his find-
ings of fact and evaluations of the merits and credibility of 
petitioner's claims are reversible only when clearly erroneous. 121 
113See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), set out at note 7 supra. 
114See, e.g., Madigan v. Wells, 224 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 911 
(1956), where the court reversed the grant of a writ of habeas corpus by the district court for 
the reason that petitioner had previously been denied similar relief under § 2255 by the 
sentencing court, and that there was no allegation in the habeas petition that the remedy by 
motion to vacate was inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of the sentence. Id. at 
577-78. This decision was rendered in spite of the fact that the court agreed with the lower 
court's legal conclusion regarding the validity of petitioner's claim. The reversal appears to 
have been grounded solely on the appellate court's conclusion that the district court was 
without jurisdiction to hear the petition. 
115342 U.S. 205 (1952). 
116/d. at 219. 
117See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,427 (1962); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 
415, 421 (1959) (concurring opinion); Brown v. United States, 351 F.2d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 
1965); Williams v. United States, 283 F.2d 59, 60 (10th Cir. 1960). 
118See Cagle v. Humphrey, 112 F. Supp. 846,847 (M.D. Pa. 1953), where the court said in 
denying habeas corpus: 
This remedy[§ 2255] is not an intermediate step but an exclusive substitute except 
in those rare situations where the remedy by motion would be inadequate or 
ineffectual. Since the remedy under§ 2255 is exclusive, if applic'ant is unsuccessful 
on such motion, it does not entitle him to a reconsideration by habeas corpus in 
another district. His remedy is by appeal from the judgment on the motion. 
119The mere denial of relief under § 2255 does not demonstrate the inadequacy or 
ineffectiveness of the motion remedy, entitling one to seek a writ of habeas corpus. See 
Walker v. United States, 429 F.2d 1301, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Sanchez v. 
Taylor, 302 F.2d 725, 726 (10th Cir. 1962) (per curiam), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 864 (1962); 
United States v. Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312,314 (3d Cir. 1953),cert. denied, 347 U.S. 902 (1954); 
Jones v. Squier, 195 F.2d 179, 180 (9th Cir. 1952); Martin v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 350,352 (5th Cir. 
1949). 
120See, e.g., Irwin v. United States, 414 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Parsons v. 
United States, 404 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 
445, 448 (9th Cir. 1962); McBee v. Bomar, 296 F.2d 235, 237 (6th Cir. 1961); Beck v. Wings 
Field, Inc., 122 F.2d 114, 116 (3d Cir. 1941:,. 
121 See Lucero v. United States, 425 F.2d 172, 173 (10th Cir, 1970) (per curiam); Martin v. 
'United States, 399 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam). 
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Thus, the appellate checks upon the 2255 judge are extremely 
limited, leaving the right of collateral review (pursuant to rule 4(a)) 
subject to the power of the very judge whose rulings are being 
attacked. 
Ill. PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS PRIOR TO 
THE PROMULGATION OF RULE 4(a) 
A. The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has never squarely considered the issue of 
the propriety of the same judge's presiding at both the criminal trial 
and the subsequent hearing attacking the validity of that trial. It 
has, however, implicitly approved the practice by acknowledging 
its use in three major cases, 122 two of which provide interesting, if 
not lucid, dicta touching on the issue. 
In Machibroda v. United States, 123 petitioner pleaded guilty to 
two informations and was given consecutive sentences of twenty-
five and fifteen years. 124 Three years later, petitioner filed a motion 
to vacate sentence before the same judge who had sentenced him, 
on the ground that the pleas had been induced by promises of the 
assistant United States attorney that petitioner would receive a 
maximum sentence of not more than twenty years. 125 
The Government admitted that the assistant United States attor-
ney had visited petitioner in jail before sentencing and had told him 
the court might well take his refusal to talk into consideration, but· 
denied that he had made any promises or threats. 126 Without an 
evidentiary hearing, the judge determined that petitioner's allega-
tions were false and denied the motion. 127 The Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 128 
122See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 219(1%9); Sanders v. United States, 373 
U.S I, 20 (1963); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962) & 4% (dissenting 
opinion). In Kaufman, the trial judge dismissed the petition because he believed that the 
issue of illegal search and seizure was not cognizable on a motion to vacate. Therefore, the 
issue of the same judge's presiding was not relevant to the Supreme Court's decision on that 
issue. · 
123368 U.S. 487 (1%2). 
124/d. at 488. 
125/d. at 488, 489. 
126/d. at 491-92. 
121United States v. Machibroda, 184 F. Supp. 881, 883, 885-86 (N.D. Ohio 1959), affd, 
280 F.2d 379 (6th Cir. 1960) (per curiam), rev'd, 368 U.S. 487 (1962). 
128Machibroda v. United States, 280 F.2d 379 (6th Cir. 1%0) (per curiam), rev'd, 368 U.S. 
487 (1%2). 
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and 
remanded for a hearing, 129 stating that the district court had not 
proceeded in conformity with 28 U .S.C. § 2255 when it made 
findings on controverted issues of fact without an evidentiary hear-
ing.130 Since the petition alleged occurrences outside the court-
room, there was no record. Thus, "[t]his was not a case [which 
could be] conclusively determined either by the motion ... or by 
the 'files and records' in the trial court." 131 
Despite the clear language of the statute that only those cases 
which can conclusively be decided by the motions, files, and rec-
ords require no hearing, 132 the Supreme Court intimated that there 
might be yet other cases which the 2255 judge could resolve with-
out a hearing by "drawing upon his own personal knowledge or 
recollection." 133 The Court did not spell out, however, what cir-
cumstances would create such a case, concluding obliquely that: 
What has been said is not to imply that a movant must always 
be allowed to appear in a district court for a full hearing if the 
record does not conclusively and expressly belie his claim, no 
matter how vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible his allega-
tions may be. The language of the statute does not strip the 
district courts of all discretion to exercise their common 
sense. 134 
The dissent contended that the majority had rejected tht! infer-
ences drawn from the files and records by the courts below and had 
substituted its own finding that "these materials do not conclu-
sively belie petitioner's story .... " 135 According to the dissent, 
the opinion represents a failure to give due deference to the infer-
ences drawn by the two lower courts, and unwarrantedly restricts 
the summary disposition provision of section 2255. 136 
Whether one agrees with the dissent or not, it seems safe to say 
that the majority's proposed standard of "palpably incredible" 
allegations is too vague to be helpful. Moreover, the entitlement of 
the trial judge to rely upon his personal knowledge to defeat a 2255 
petition is not necessarily limited by this standard. Even though the 
allegations are precise and are not palpably incredible, the Court 
129Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 496 (1962). 
130/d. at 494. 
13'/d. 
132See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), which reads in part that "[u]nless the motion and the files 
and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court 
shall ... grant a prompt hearing thereon .... " 
'
33Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. at 495. 
134/d. 
mid. at 497 (dissenting opinion). 
136/d. 
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seems to say that the trial judge may still use his personal know-
ledge to defeat a 2255 petition. 137 If the trial judge may so use his 
personal knowledge, it is not clear under the language of Machib-
roda whether the trial judge may rely upon this knowledge in order 
to dismiss a petition without holding any evidentiary hearing at all, 
or whether the judge must hold a hearing, at which time he may 
interject his personal knowledge to defeat petitioner's claims. 
However the problem is viewed, neither procedure suggested 
would be satisfactory. Were the judge permitted to avoid an 
evidentiary hearing altogether, the procedure would contradict the 
holding of Machibroda that the 2255 judge may not make findings 
on controverted issues of fact without an evidentiary hearing. On 
the other hand, were the judge permitted to be the State's material 
witness, and then to rule on the truth and veracity of his own 
testimony in order to defeat petitioner's claims, the court would be 
embroiled in a conflict of interests, thereby giving rise to due 
process issues. 138 
The question of whether a trial judge may rely upon his personal 
knowledge to defeat a petitioner's claim was addressed again in 
Sanders v. United States. 139 There, petitioner, without assistance 
of counsel, pleaded guilty to a charge of robbery .140 At the sentenc-
ing, petitioner requested that the court send him to an institution 
for treatment of drug addiction, stating, "I have been using narco-
tics off and on for quite a while." 141 Several months later, 
petitioner filed a motion to vacate alleging that when he pleaded 
guilty and was sentenced he was mentally incompetent because 
narcotics were administered to him by the medical authorities at 
the jai,l while he awaited his appearance in court. 142 The judge who 
had received his guilty plea and sentenced him denied the motion 
without a hearing, stating that "petitioner's complaints are without 
merit in fact." 143 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
'"'Id. at 495, where the majority said: "Nor were the circumstances alleged of a kind that 
the District Judge could completely resolve by drawing upon his own personal knowledge or 
recollection." 
138See Part III C / & IV B infra. 
139373 U.S. I (1963). 
140/d. at 4. 
141/d. 
142/d. at 5. 
143 Unreported opinion, quoted in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 6. The denial of a 
hearing in the lower court was also based upon the trialjudge's opinion that§ 2255 gave him 
discretionary power to refuse a hearing where petitioner could have raised the claim on a 
prior motion, but had failed to do so. Id. at 6. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for 
a hearing, after having noted both grounds for denial of the hearing. The Court's opinion, 
however, deals more extensively with the trial judge's discretionary power to deny hearings 
on subsequent petitions than it does with the trial judge's p·ower to rely on his personal 
knowledge to defeat petitioner's claim. 
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affirmed; 144 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a hear-
ing.145 
Significantly, the Supreme Court recognized that certain facts 
outside the record might be known to the 2255 judge who had 
received petitioner's guilty plea and sentenced him, but observed 
that the facts alleged in this particular petition could not have been 
known to the trial judge. 146 Therefore, the judge's impression that 
the petitioner acted with intelligence and understanding in respond-
ing to the judge's inquiries "[could not] 'conclusively show,' as the 
statute requires, that there [was] no merit in [petitioner's] 
claim." 147 This statement suggests by negative implication that 
were the facts of the petition within the personal knowledge of the 
judge, his impressions would be treated as part of the "files and 
records" for purposes of determining whether to grant or deny an 
evidentiary hearing. Since those impressions are, in fact, unre-
corded memories of the judge, their use under the guise of "files 
and records" would not only defeat petitioner's right to an eviden-
tiary hearing whenever the facts are in dispute, but also would 
defeat the plain meaning of the statute that "[u]nless the motion 
and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the 
prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall ... grant a prompt 
hearing .... " 148 . In addition to this potential use of the trial 
judge's past observations as "records and files," it is also possible 
that past observations may be used by the judge to determine that a 
claim is "insubstantial" and therefore within the trial judge's dis-
cretionary power to grant or deny an evidentiary hearing. In San-
ders, the Court recognized that the sentencing judge "has discre-
tion to ascertain whether the claim is substantial before granting a 
full evidentiary hearing," 149 but declined to accept the trial judge's 
finding that the complaints lacked merit. Instead, the Court recon-
sidered the files, records, and the facts alleged in the petition, and, 
drawing its own inferences, concluded that no answer could be 
deduced from the files and that the statute therefore required a 
hearing. 150 The Court thereby precluded the trial judge's exercise 
of discretion, and his use of common sense, past observations, and 
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom as factors to be weighed in 
the final decision to grant or deny an evidentiary hearing. 
144S ee Sanders v. United States, 297 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1%1) (per curiam), rev'd, 373 U.S. 
I (1963). 
145Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 6. 
146Id. at 20. 
'"Id. 
148See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). 
149373 U.S. at 21. 
150Id. at 20. 
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From Machibroda and Sanders one may infer that there are 
limited circumstances when the trial judge presumably may use 
common sense, past observations, and discretion to deny 2255 
petitions. But neither of these opinions is helpful since neither 
establishes a clear standard, or involves facts that would permit the 
use of common sense or reasonable inference based upon past 
observations. Moreover, no specific situation was suggested in 
either opinion as being an appropriate one for summary disposi-
tion, without an evidentiary hearing, based upon the judge's per-
sonal knowledge. The extent to which a trial judge may use his past 
observations in evaluating 2255 petitions is thus unresolved. 
B. The Courts of Appeals 
Since the adoption of section 2255, it has never been error per se 
for the same judge to rule upon the correctness or fairness of his 
own judgment of conviction. 151 There have been, however, various 
exceptions to this general rule, the broadest of which was created 
by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 
In Halliday v. United States, 152 the trial court accepted defen-
dant's guilty plea without inquiring into the voluntariness of his 
plea or his understanding of the charges. 153 Twelve years later, 
defendant filed a motion to vacate, requesting that he be permitted 
to change his plea because he did not understand the significance of 
the proceeeding. 154 The original sentencingjudge heard the motion 
despite defendant's request that a different judge preside. 155 Fol-
lowing the hearing, the court ruled that the original proceeding was 
sufficient, since there was nothing to indicate that defendant had 
not acted voluntarily or had not understood the signficance of the 
proceeding. 156 
151 Arguably, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held this procedure to be error 
per se. See Mawson v. United States, 463 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1972) (percuriam); Halliday 
v. United States, 380 F.2d 270, 272-73 (1st Cir. 1967), petition denied, 274 F. Supp. 737 (D. 
Mass. 1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1968), aff'd, 394 U.S. 831 (1969) (per curiam); 
Haverhill Gazette Co. v. Union Leader, 333 F.2d 798,808 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 
U.S. 931 (1964). 
The general rule as stated in Haverhill was that where a second trial is required, a different 
judge should preside. Since a motion to vacate is a different cause of action and not a 
continuation of the criminal proceeding, it is a different trial falling within the rule of 
Haverhill. See Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d at 272. In Halliday, however, the court 
distinguished factfinding from rulings of law. Id. at 272-74. Therefore, the rule of the First 
Circuit may be that it is not error per se for the same judge to rule only upon a question of 
law, which is subject to review by appeal; whereas, it would be error per se for him to take 
evidence and make findings of fact. 
152380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967). 
153/d. at 271. 
154/d. at 271-72. 
155/d. at 272. 
1ss1d. 
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The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 imposes a burden of inquiry 
into the facts. 157 The necessity of a factual inquiry ..raised the 
further issue of the propriety of allowing the same judge, who had 
already made a finding of voluntariness on inadequate evidence, to 
review the correctness of that determination. The court of appeals 
held that this was not proper, since the 2255 court was "re-
weighing factual inferences and credibility, as distinguished from 
applying rulings on issues of law." 158 In ruling, the court expressly 
rejected Judge Parker's thesis that the purpose of section 2255 was 
to permit the trial judge to review his own proceedings. 159 
Moreover, the court rejected the contention that "it would be 
unseemly for a judge to testify in contradiction to a defendant as to 
a past occurrence in his courtroom," and asserted that "it [would 
be] far worse that he should be the trier of fact to determine his 
own credibility." 160 Nevertheless, the court found no constitu-
tional compulsion for its ruling; rather, the decision was premised 
upon a "conviction that the best practice dictates such a pol-
icy." 161 
Beyond this broad exception requiring recusation where the 
court is engaged in factfinding, the practice ofretuming to the same 
judge was generally approved before the adoption of rule 4(a). 162 It 
was not considered to be a violation of any notion of objectivity 
under the due process clause, 163 and even where the trialjudge had 
referred to the petition as "scurrilous," it was held not to be a 
prejudgment that denied petitioner a fair hearing. 164 The practice 
157/d .. 
158/d. at 272-73. 
159/d. at 273. The court stated "[W]e are not persuaded ... that the judge's connection 
with the drafting of section 2255 should supplement legislative history that contains no such 
suggestion, and which demonstrates concern with quite a different matter." 
160/d. at 273. 
161/d. at 274. Even then, the court felt the practice would necessarily have to yield in 
single-judge districts. This result is unnecessary. Congress has provided several means for 
obtaining extra judicial help in any district court. See 28 U .S.C. §§ 291(c); 292(b); 292(c); 
294(d); 296 (1970). See also note 166 infra. 
162See, e.g., Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782, 788 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, '389 
U.S. l022 (1967); United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681,684 (3d Cir. 1954); 
Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348, 348-49 (4th Cir. 1949); Guerra v. United States, 447 
F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Osborn, 415 F.2d 1021, l025 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 1015 (1970); Simpson v. United States, 342 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1965); Davis 
v. United States, 210 F.2d 118, 122 (8th Cir. 1954) (by implication); Reiffv. United States, 
299 F.2d 366, 367 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 937 (1963); Wrone v. United States,. 
367 F.2d 169 (10th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Clark v. Memolo, 174 F.2d 978, 982 (D.C. Cir. 
1949). 
163See Wrone v. United States, 367 F.2d 169, 170 (10th Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (by 
implication); United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 5 I n.4 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 
U.S. 916 (1965). 
164See Reiffv.·United States, 299 F.2d 366,367 (9th Cir. 1962) (percuriam), cert. denied, 
372 U .s. 937 (1963). 
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was also held not to violate the prohibition against suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus; 165 and, finally, it was held not to invoke 
the exception under section 2255 that when the motion remedy is 
"inadequate or ineffective" to test the validity of the judgment, 
petitioner may seek a writ of habeas corpus in the district of 
confinement. 166 
A number of limited exceptions to the general rule are, however, 
imposed by statute and case law, although there is no general 
agreement among the circuits as to when any of them is to be 
invoked. The statutory exceptions are: (1) that the same judge is 
not permitted to preside where he would have to appear as a 
witness; 167 (2) that the same judge is not permitted to preside 
where specific bias or prejudice is asserted in an affidavit timely 
filed, 168 and (3) that the same judge is not permitted to preside 
where interest in the cause is alleged. 169 Although rule 4(a) says 
that the same judge "shall" sit, and provides no exceptions other 
than "unavailability" of that judge, 170 these statutory exceptions 
should be read into the rule. Section 2255 is not expressly excepted 
from any of these statutory recusation requirements; there is there-
fore no good reason why any of these statutory provisions govern-
ing judicial behavior should not be considered to govern 2255 
proceedings. 
The courts have required recusation under other limited cir-
cumstances, for example, where hearsay matters, such as presen-
tence reports, might affect the judge's objectivity; 171 where the 
judge is accused of having threatened to give petitioner a more 
severe sentence were he to go to trial rather than plead guilty; 172 or 
where the petition seeks reduction of a sentence .1 73 These excep-
165See Cantu v. Markley, 353 F.2d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 1965). 
•••see Stirone v. Markley, 345 F.2d 473, 474 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 
(1965); Madigan v. Wells, 224 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 911 (1956); 
United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681,684 (3d Cir. 1954); United States v. 
Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 902 (1954). 
This argument rests upon the tenuous proposition that since there are single-judge dis-
tricts, Congress must certainly have anticipated that the same judge would hear motions to 
vacate sentences that he had already entered. See United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 53 
(4th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954). 
This conclusion is unwarranted in light of the ample statutory provisions for reassignment of 
judges to different districts. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291(c); 292(b); 292(c); 294(d); 296 (1970). 
167See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V 1975). 
168See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). This statute may not, however, be invoked in § 2255 
proceedings on the sole ground that the court rendered an adverse ruling in the prior criminal 
proceeding. See Deitle v. United States, 302 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir. 1962). 
16928 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V 1975). 
110Rule 4(a) governing 2255 proceedings, Order of April 26, 1976, 96 S. Ct. at 27 (yellow 
pages) (1976). 
171 See Battaglia v. United States, 390 F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1968). 
'
72See Matthews v. United States, 533 F.2d 900,901, 901 n.2 (5th Cir. 1976) (No rationale 
was given for the recusation.). 
173See United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 114_1, 1143 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). 
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tions have been justified for policy reasons, such as the "appear-
ance of justice," or for the "sake of the judge." 174 
To the extent that rule 4(a) may be considered declarative of 
prior practice, these exceptions can be read into the rule by con~ 
struing it to permit recusation where necessary under the rubric 
that the judge is deemed "unavailable" to preside. The language of 
the rule, however, does not lend itself easily to such an interpreta-
tion. Moreover, to construe the rule so liberally would destroy the 
presumed advantages that Judge Parker envisioned by permitting 
the same judge to preside. 
C. The Judge As Witness and Trier of Fact 
1. Personal Observations: Error-The Supreme Court ruled in 
Sanders v. United States 175 that the judge's impressions or per-
sonal observations of the defendant were not conclusive of the 
issue of defendant's competency to stand trial. 176 This limitation 
has been followed in the courts of appeals, 177 narrowly construed 
to apply only to the issue of competency to stand trial. 178 But, as 
suggested before, the Court in Sanders did not explain why the trial 
judge's observations were not conclusive; and even if not conclu-
sive, why they were not at least entitled to weight in determining 
whether to deny an evidentiary hearing. In any event, it does not 
seem likely that the decision in Sanders rested upon the premise 
that the judge should not inject himself at all as a witness in the 
determination of fact issues. 
Certainly, where the judge is to provide information as a formal 
witness, he is not permitted to act both as a witness and as a trier o·f 
those facts which he introduces into the record. 179 The propriety of 
such a practice would certainly be at issue. Yet even if the judge's 
honesty or integrity were not at issue, the procedure would still be 
highly improper. A judge's sense perceptions and memory are as 
subject to failure as those of any other witness. It would be highly 
questionable that ajudge as the trier of fact could properly give his 
own recollections more credibility than those of other witnesses, 
so that he could determine whose testimony is correct and whose 
174S ee United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141, 1143 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Mawson 
v. United States, 463 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1972). 
175373 U.S. I (1%3). 
116/d. at 20. 
177See United States v. Collier, 399 F.2d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1968); Floyd v. United States, 
365 F.2d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1966); Roe v. United States, 325 F.2d 556,558 (8th Cir. 1963) (per 
curiam). 
178See United States v. Collier, 399 F.2d at 707; Floyd v. United States, 365 F.2d at 378; 
Roe v. United States, 325 F.2d at 558. 
179See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); See also 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V 1975). 
68 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:44 
incorrect, since this presumes that there is no weakness in his own 
recollections. 
Under Judge Parker's conception of 2255 proceedings, the sen-
tencing judge would not be called as a formal witness, but would be 
permitted to remain on the bench, casually interjecting his past 
recollections into the proceedings, either by commenting or sim-
ply by privately corroborating the testimony of certain witnesses 
and discounting the testimony of others. This procedure would be 
comparable to one which permitted a judge to be called as a formal 
witness, only to return to the bench to declare his testimony 
credible and the testimony of those whom he refuted not credible. 
Clearly, this latter procedure would be inappropriate under 28 
U.S.C. § 455, if not a denial of due process of law. Yet, even this 
procedure provides more protection than the informal witness pro-
cedure envisioned by Judge Parker. As a formal witness, the judge 
is at least subject to cross-examination, and his past recollections 
are made part of the record for appeal. Where he remains on the 
bench as an informal witness, however, neither of these protec-
tions remains. 
The difficulties with pei:mitting the judge to act as both witness 
and trier of fact in the same proceeding are well demonstrated by 
the case of Aeby v. United States. 180 In 1952, Aeby was convicted 
after a jury trial and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. 181 
Over the next seventeen years, he filed a number of motions to 
vacate his sentence .182 In his fourth motion, petitioner alleged that 
both the trial judge and the United States attorney had made 
prejudicial remarks before the jury during closing arguments. In 
particular, the judge had allegedly remarked that petitioner had 
previously appeared before the judge on similar narcotics charges, 
that the judge had personally sentenced petitioner on those viola-
tions, and that the judge was personally aware of petitioner's use of 
narcotics. The United States attorney had allegedly made prejudi-
cial remarks in his closing argument concerning petitioner's prior 
record, his failure to testify, and his association with a known 
narcotics violator. 183 No record of closing arguments was then in 
existence. 184 
The 2255 judge denied the motion without a hearing and entered 
an order that stated in part: 
180425 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). 
'"'Id. at 718. 
182/d. See Aeby v. United States, 255 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1958); Aeby v. United States, 267 
F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1959) (per curiam); Aeby v. United States, 409 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1969) (per 
curiam). 
'
83See Aeby v. United States, 425 F.2d at 718-19. 
184/d. at 718. 
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The undersigned presided at both the trial and sentencing of this 
Petitioner .... 
The Court recalls all of the proceedings therein and hereby 
finds and certifies that the arguments and statements alleged by 
Petitioner to have been made by this Court and the prosecuting 
attorney in the presence of the jury were not made and there 
was no reference in the presence of the jury to any of the 
matters so alleged by Petitioner. 185 
69 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and re-
manded for an evidentiary hearing on the basis that the district 
judge's recollections, nearly seventeen years after the trial, were 
not part of the record for the purpose of determining whether an 
evidentiary hearing was required. 186 The court, citing Halliday v. 
United States, 187 also ordered the hearing to be held before a 
different judge. 188 
The court in Aeby did not consider the question of denial of due 
process or of the impropriety of the 2255 judge's interjection of his 
personal recollections as an informal witness and ruling on his own 
credibility in opposition to that of petitioner. The holding was 
simply that seventeen years is too long a time to qualify the judge's 
recollections as part of the "records and files." Reliance upon 
Halliday was not explained. The Court in Halliday had simply held 
that it was the better practice, where factfinding was involved, to 
require a different judge to preside. 189 In an Aeby situation, how-
ever, it would seem to be necessary as a matter of due process to 
remand to a differentjudge. Where the judge by formal order of the 
court expresses his firm belief that his recollections of an unre-
corded event occurring seventeen years before are flawlessly in-
tact, and that none of the petitioner's claims are true, the court is 
hop~lessly entwined in a dual role of being a witness to events and 
a trier of fact to determine the truth of those events. Moreover, 
since the trier of fact has already made up his mind with respect to 
the ultimate facts to be found, any subsequent evidentiary hearing 
would be meaningless. 
What should be of concern here is that remand to a different 
judge, under circumstances like the Aeby case, is no longer permis-
sible under a strict reading of rule 4(a). 190 Upon· remand, such a 
case would go to the very same judge who had already made up his 
mind about the facts; any subsequent evidentiary hearing would be 
1••1i ·at 719. 
'""Id. 
187380 F.2d 270 (I st Cir. 1967). 
188Aeby v. United States, 425 F.2d at 719. 
189380 F.2d 270, 274 (I st Cir. 1967). 
190See notes 12-13 and accompanying te.xt supra. 
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little more than proforma, and would appear to be a farce in terms 
of due process. 
2. Personal Observations and Prior Knowledge-There are 
many cases in which the practice of returning to the same judge has 
been challenged. 191 Various objections have been raised, 192 but the 
'"'A. Request for different judge denied: Hoffa v. United States, 471 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 
1972); Odom v. United States, 455 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); United States v. 
Delsanter, 433 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam); -Morrison v. United States, 432 F.2d 
1227 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971); Davis v. United States, 
424 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 836 (1970); Burris v. 
United States, 430 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971); Lucero v. 
United States, 425 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Panico v. United States, 412 F.2d 
1151 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.921 (1970); Wagner v. United States, 418 F.2d 618 
(9th Cir. 1969); Dukes v. United States, 407 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 3% U.S. 
897 (1969); King v. United States, 402 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1968); Mirra v. United States, 379 
F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967); Wrone v. United States, 367 F.2d 
169 (10th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. 
denied, 381 U.S. 916 (1965); United States v. Hughes, 325 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. 
denied, 377 U.S. 907 (1964); Deitle v. United States, 302 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1962); Simmons 
v. United States, 302 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1962); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 
1962) (by implication); Reiff v. United States, 299 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1962) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 372 U.S. 937 (1963); United States v. Halley, 240 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1957) (per 
curiam) (dictum), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 967 (1957); Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348 
(4th Cir. 1949) (per curiam). 
B. Request for different ji,dge granted: United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 
1973) (per curiam) (The failure of the Government to keep its bargain that it would not 
oppose defendant's request for probation required rehearing before a different judge to 
determine "whether or not the sentencing judge was influenced by that failure," for the sake 
of the "appearance of justice."); Mawson v. United States, 463 F.2d 29 (I st Cir. 1972) (per 
curiam) (The failure of the Government to keep its promise to recommend a more lenient 
sentence required resentencing before a different judge for the "appearance of justice."); 
Durant v. United States, 410 F.2d 689 (1st Cir. 1969) (Where a rehearing was necessary to 
determine the voluntariness of a guilty plea, a different judge was required.); Halliday v. 
United States, 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1%7), petition denied, 274 F. Supp. 737 (D. Mass. 
1967), afj' d, 394 F.2d 149 (1968) (per curiam), afj'd, 394 U.S. 831 (1969)(per curiam) (It was 
improper for the sentencing judge, once having made a finding of voluntariness on in-
adequate evidence, to preside over a 2255 proceeding to determine the voluntariness of a 
guilty plea.); United States v. Valentino, 283 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam) (The judge 
was disqualified where he was called as a material witness.). See also, Battaglia v. United 
States, 390 F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1968), where the court of appeals reversed and remanded 
for a hearing, leaving the decision of whether to recuse to the district judge. The court said: 
If, however, the judge discovers that he cannot avoid the consideration of material 
contained in the presentence report, or any other hearsay information· not disclosed 
to a party to the § 2255 hearing, the preservation of the proper image of justice 
requires that he do one of two things. He should either excuse himself from 
conducting the hearing, or he should reveal the particular information to the parties 
Id. at 259. 
192See Hoffa v. United States, 471 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1973) (prior adverse ruling); 
Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1972) (motion under 28 U .S.C. § 455 for 
interest where presiding judge was listed as "of counsel" at criminal trial); Morrison v. 
United States, 432 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (motion under 28 U .S.C. § 144 for 
bias where judge had observed a presentence report); Davis v. United States, 424 F.2d 1061 
(5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (kn·owledge gained at trial before the judge without a jury); 
Wagner v. United States, 418 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1969) (prior adverse ruling); Dukes v. 
United States, 407 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1969) (motion under 28 U.S.C. § 144 for bias arguing 
that a hearing before the same judge was per se improper); Panico v. United States, 412 F.2d 
1151 (2d Cir. 1969) (motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455 for interest where the judge was a material 
witness); King v. United States, 402 F.2d 58 (9th .Cir. 1%8) (motion under 28 U.S.C. § 144 
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majority of the cases hold that there is no error in the practice. 193 
These holdings generally rely upon the claimed statutory purpose 
espoused by Judge Parker that it was the intent of section 2255 to 
permit the trial judge to use his personal observations and recollec-
tions of the trial to refute false claims of petitioners brought in 
collateral proceedings. 194 
Prior adverse rulings alone are not considered sufficient to dis-
qualify the judge from presiding over the 2255 hearing. 195 Where 
the judge has gained knowledge about petitioner from hearsay 
contained in presentence reports, this knowledge is not considered 
prejudicial even though the source of that knowledge is not intro-
duced into evidence and is not discoverable by the petitioner. 196 
Personal observations of the judge that counsel did not appear 
incompetent at the criminal trial have been used to refute petition-
ers' claims of incompetency of counsel. 197 In addition, judicial 
notice has been taken of the general competency of counsel to 
reject a claim of incompetency .198 Finally, the court's inability to 
have any personal recollections at all of biased statements al-
for bias where petitioner alleged that threatening words of the judge coerced him to plead 
guilty); Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1967) (personal observations at trial); 
Wrone v. United States, 367 F.2d 169 (10th Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (denial of fair hearing); 
United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1964) (motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455 arguing 
that the judge had an interest in protecting the criminal judgment); United States v. Hughes, 
325 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1964) (motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455 where the judge was a material 
witness); Deitle v. United States, 302 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. l962)(motion under 28 U.S.C. § 144 
for bias on the basis of a prior adverse ruling); Simmons v. United States, 302 F.2d 71 (3d 
Cir. 1962) (denial of due process); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962) (by 
implication: material witness); Reiff v. United States, 299 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1962) (per 
curiam) (prejudgment before hearing); United States v. Halley, 240 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1957) 
(per curiam) (material witness); Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949) (per 
curiam)_ (impropriety of the procedure). 
193See cases cited in note 191 A. supra. 
•••See Panico v. United States, 412 F.2d 1151, 1155-56 (2d Cir. 1969); King v. United 
States, 402 F.2d 58, 60 (9th Cir. 1968); Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782, 788 (2d Cir. 
1967); Wrone v. United States, 367 F.2d 169, 170 (10th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); United States 
v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 51-53 (4th Cir. 1964); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445,453 (9th 
Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion); Deitle v. United States, 302 F.2d 116, I 18 n.2 (7th Cir. 1962); 
United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954). 
195See Deitle v. United States, 302 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir. 1962); Simmons v. United 
States, 302 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. I 962), where the court stated that disqualification for 
prejudice "was never intended to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of 
adverse rulings .... " See also, Hoffa v. United· States, 471 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1973) (no 
impropriety in the same judge's presiding over issues raised before in a prior motion to 
vacate); Gallarelli v. United States, 260 F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir. 1958) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 359 U.S. 938 (19.59) (not disqu.alified for prejudice despite judge's having a "judicial 
predilection" obtained from hearing the criminal case). 
196Compare Morrison v. United States, 432 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); 
with Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 450 (9th Cir. 1962) (the court sustained·an 
objection to inquiry concerning the presentence report), and Battaglia v. United States, 390 
F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1968). 
191Compare Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 
358 U.S. 850 (I 958) (appellate court's observation); with United States v. Summerlin, 298 F . 
. Supp. 929, 930 (M.D. Ala. 1969). 
'""See United States v. Summerlin, 298 F. Supp. at 930. 
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legedly made by him in the course of the trial has been used to 
reject a claim that such statements were ever made. 199 
In Burris v. United States, 200 the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit imputed personal knowledge to the trial judge in 
order to affirm the trial judge's denial of a 2255 hearing. In that 
case, petitioner had alleged (1) that the trial judge had denied him a 
fair trial by telling the jurors a story about children who were 
addicted to narcotics, (2) that the trial judge had coerced the jurors 
into returning a verdict by sending a verbal instruction through the 
United States Marshal to "[t]ell the jury if they can't reach a 
verdict in the next 30 minutes I will be compelled to lock them up 
for the weekend," (3) that two agents and the United States Attor-
ney had discussed the case in the corridor in the presence of 
several members of the jury, and (4) that two agents had conducted 
private conversations with members of the jury. 201 
The 2255 judge, without requesting a response from the Gov-
ernment or holding an evidentiary hearing, summarily denied the 
motion, 202 noting in his memorandum opinion that the first two 
allegations were not reflected in the record, and that the last two 
"allegation[s] ... [were] untrue .... " 203 The court of appeals 
affirmed, holding that the 2255 judge was entitled to discount the 
first two claims based upon the records and his own personal 
knowledge, 204 and that the dismissal of the last two claims could be 
justified on the presumption that the trial judge found them "in-
credible" since "[j]urors are closely supervised .... " 205 
In Dillon v. United States, 206 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit did not consider it error for the 2255 judge to act as the 
presidingjudge and as a formal witness where he was merely asked 
one question which he refused to answer. 207 Petitioner attempted 
in that case to demonstrate that a promise had been made to him by 
the United States Attorney that he would recommend to the judge 
a reduced sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. 208 He then called 
199/d. at 930. 
200430 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971). 
201/d. at 400. 
202/d. at 401. 
2oa1d. 
20•1d. 
205/d. at 402. 
206307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962). 
201 Since the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of counsel and re111anded 
for a hearing, the majority did not consider it necessary to reach petitioner's second claim 
that the 2255 judge should not have presided because he had taken the witness stand. 
Nonetheless, the court implicitly rejected the claim by remanding to the same judge for 
further proceedings, saying only that "[o]ther grounds urged for reversal by the appellant 
are unlikely to arise at a second hearing prepared and conducted by an attorney." 307 F .2d 
at 451. 
208/d. at 446, 448. 
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the judge to the witnes9 stand and asked him whether he had been 
given impressions of such a promise by the presentence report. 209 
When the Government objected to this question, the judge sus-
tained the objection and then, following his own ruling, refused to 
answer_the question. 210 At the conclusion of the hearing, "[t]he 
court found that there was no absolute promise that a recom-
mendation would be made, and that appellant knew a recom-
mendation might not be requested." 211 
The dissent asserted that "[a]ny error that could be attached to 
the trial judge acting both as presiding judge and witness could not 
have been prejudicial, particularly here where but one question 
was asked of the judge and none answered. " 212 He justified this 
procedure on the basis of the presumed historical purpose of sec-
tion 2255 to permit the same judge to preside. 213 
Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held, in 
Davis v. United States, 214 that where the judge's recollections 
differ from petitioner's, petitioner has the right to an evidentiary 
hearing before that judge to try to convince him that his recollec-
tions are faulty. 215 In 1935, petitioner Davis, without assistance of 
counsel, pleaded guilty to a charge of kidnapping and was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment. 216 Fifteen years later, he filed a mo-
tion to vacate the sentence before the same judge alleging, among 
other things, that he had been sentenced without advice of counsel 
and without knowing that he had a right to counsel. 217 
The 2255 judge denied his motion without a hearing, basing the 
denial upon the conclusiveness of the files and records, which 
showed that petitioner was not entitled to relief,218 and upon his 
own personal recollections, which were "corroborated" by the 
record. 219 The memorandum opinion found that petitioner had 
been fully apprised of his right to counsel, and that he had intelli-
gently waived that right. 220 The record of the original guilty plea, 
however, reflected only that upon being questioned by the court 
the defendant had "stated that he did not desire the advice of 
209/d. at 453 n.2 (dissenting opinion); and at 450 (question paraphrased in the majority 
opinion). 
210/d. at 450-51. 
211/d. at 449. 
212/d. at 453 (dissenting opinion). 
21a1d. 
214210 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1954). 
215/d. at 122. 
•i•Jd. at 119. 
2111d. 
218/d. at 120. 
219/d. at 122. 
2201d. 
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counsel and entered a plea of guilty of the charge in the indict-
ment. "221 
The court of appeals stated that while the 2255 judge had denied 
petitioner the evidentiary hearing contemplated by section 2255, it 
would appear to be "a comparatively useless expenditure of time 
and money to hold a hearing" in order to give a convicted person 
an opportunity to convince the trial judge that his recollection was 
faulty. 222 Nonetheless, the court reversed and remanded to the 
same judge for the required hearing, saying, "there is no good 
reason why [the petitioner] should not have the same opportunity 
to correct what he believes to be a faulty recollection of the 
judge. "223 
Burris, Dillion, and Davis were decided under a procedure anal-
ogous to that now imposed by rule 4(a); they demonstrate clearly 
the improbability that 2255 proceedings pursuant to the rule 4(a) 
procedure will be anything more than a pro forma review. 
3. Statutory Disqualification Where the judge is or may be a 
"Material Witness" -Prior to its revision in 1974, 28 U .S.C. § 455 
provided in part that a federal judge must recuse "in any case in 
which he ... is or has been a material witness .... " 224 In United 
States v. Smith, 225 petitioner argued that the judge who took his 
guilty pleas and sentenced him should not be permitted to rule on 
his motion to vacate since the judge had been a "material witness" 
to the events that transpired in the criminal proceedings, and 
thereafter had relied upon his memory of those events to supple-
ment the record at the 2255 hearing. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, saying that the judge was 
not a "material witness" within the meaning of section 455. 226 This 
conclusion was based upon the Carvell decision227 and Judge 
Parker's view of the purpose of section 2255. 228 The court 
reasoned that the purpose of section 2255 was to permit the trial 
judge, because he was familiar with the prior proceedings and was 
able to supplement the record, to pass upon 2255 motions, and that 
it would be anomalous to disqualify that same judge under section 
455 because of his familiarity with the proceedings. 229 
221/d. -at 121 n.2. 
222/d. at 122. 
22a1d. 
224Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 908. For a discussion of the revision of 28 U .S.C. 
§ 455, see Comment, The Elusive Appearance of Propriety: Judicial Disqualification under 
Section 455, 25 DE PAUL L. REY. 104 (1975). 
225337 F.2d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 916 (1%5). 
226337 F.2d at 53. 
227Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949). 
228Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 172-73 (1948), cited as 
support for the holding in United States v. Smith, 337. F.2d at 52. 
229/d. at 53. 
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There is no basis for this result. The legislative intent of section 
2255 does not disclose any such purpose; on the contrary, it dis-
closes an intent to place the hearing in a convenient forum to 
permit easy access to records and witnesses, including the trial 
judge if he is called to testify. 230 Nonetheless, since 28 U.S.C. § 
455 has been completely revised to expand the coverage of the 
recusation requirement, the question should be reconsidered. Sec-
tion 455 now provides that "[a]ny ... judge ... shall disqualify 
himself in any proceeeding in which his impartiality might reason-
ably be questioned. " 231 One of the purposes of this revision is to 
remove the supposed "duty to sit" even though actual bias or 
impartiality cannot be demonstrated. 232 The other purpose is to 
establish an objective "reasonableness" test, eliminating the sub-
jective test based upon the judge's "own opinion" of the propriety 
of his presiding. 233 
The revised statute also sets forth explicit categories in which a 
judge must recuse and which may not be waived by the parties. 
One nonwaivable category is the required recusation of the judge 
who is a "material witness." There are two "material witness" 
provisions. The first is section 455(b)(2), which states that the 
judge "shall ... disqualify himself ... where ... the judge ... 
has been a material witness concerning [the matter in controver-
sy]. " 234 The only apparent difference between this provision and 
the prior one is that the new section is governed by the no-waiver 
clause. 
The second provision dealing with "material witness" is section 
455(b)(5)(iv), which states that the judge "shall ... disqualify 
himself [where] [h]e ... [i]s to the judge's knowledge likely to be a 
material witness in the proceeding. " 235 This provision is entirely 
new. It goes beyond the old statute by requiring the judge to 
anticipate the likelihood of his being a witness. If he considers it 
likely, then presumably he must recuse even before he is called as a 
witness. This section seems to be addressed both to the impropri-
230See notes 30-45 and accompanying text supra. 
23 '28 U .S.C. § 455(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
232See H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1971] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
Ao. NEWS 6355. The Report states that the general standard under§ 455 (a) 
is designed to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process 
by saying, in effect', if there is a reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge's 
impartiality, he should disqualify himself and let another judge preside over the 
case .... [L]egal writers and witnesses at the hearings were unanimously of the 
opinion that elimination of this "duty to sit" would enhance public confidence in 
the impartiality of the judicial system. 
233/d. at 6354-55. 
23428 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). 
23528 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iv) (Supp. V 1975). 
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ety of a judge's presiding over a matter in which his impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned, and to the lack of judicial 
economy in presiding over a matter where he might ultimately be 
required to recuse. Where the judge has knowledge of certain facts, 
making it likely that he will ultimately be called as a witness, it 
would seem inappropriate for him to preside over the initial por-
tions of the hearing, to control the introduction of evidence, to limit 
or expand the right to examine or cross-examine, and to make 
initial findings of fact, and then to participate as a material witness, 
presumably to refute certain evidence or testimony upon which he 
has entered preliminary rulings. There is no reason to presume that 
a judge's impartiality may only be questioned where he is first a 
material witness and then a factfinder; the potential for bias can. be 
as acute where he is first the presiding judge and then the material 
witness. 
Where the judge participates as an informal witness, pursuant to 
Judge Parker's notion of a 2255 proceeding, it would be equally 
prejudicial. Because it is clearly the policy of Congress to encour-
age judicial integrity (three statutes govern the subject of judicial 
disqualification), 236 there is no merit in the contention of the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that section 455 does not apply to 
2255 proceedings. Section 455 excepts no judicial proceeding, ex-
pressly or impliedly, from its requirement that no judge may pre-
side over any hearing where he was, is, or is likely to be a "mate-
rial witness'' in that same hearing. Moreover, section 2255 does 
not, expressly or impliedly, require or permit the presiding judge to 
participate as a witness, nor does it exempt the presiding judge 
from any statutory recusation requirement. It is submitted that no 
exemption should be implied by the courts. 
IV. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Contempt and Habeas Corpus 
The question whether it is a denial of due process to permit the 
same judge to rule upon the validity of his own prior sentence and 
criminal trial conduct has never been fairly considered by any 
federal court. An analogous question has, however, been consid-
ered in the law of contempt. In contempt proceedings, the same 
judge who charged a person with contempt is generally permitted 
236See 28 U.S.C. §§ 47, 144 (1970) and§ 455 (Supp. V 1975). 
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to preside over the trial to determine whether that person was 
indeed contemptuous. In that situation, the Supreme Court has 
ruled in Ungar v. Sarafite 237 that a judge is not presumed to be 
biased, requiring his recusation, unless the allegedly contemptuous 
behavior was "so probably productive of bias that the judge must 
disqualify himself to avoid being the judge in his own case 
"238 
The initial question, whether it is a denial of due process to 
permit the criminal trial judge to preside at the hearing on motion to 
vacate, was raised in United States v. Smith. 239 While petitioner's 
appeal was pending, however, Ungar v. Sarafite 240 was decided by 
the Supreme Court. Petitioner then withdrew his due process 
claim, apparently in the belief that Ungar was controlling, and the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, also of the opinion that 
Ungar was dispositive of petitioner's due process claim, com-
mented in a footnote to its opinion that Ungar "rejected the con-
tention of a defendant in a contempt proceeding that he had been 
denied due process of law because the judge who presided at the 
contempt hearing was the same judge who had presided at the trial 
in which defendant's contemptuous conduct occurred. " 241 
This is not an accurate statement of the Ungar decision; but, 
even if it were, the law of contempt should not be applied to the law 
of habeas corpus for several reasons. 242 First, the two situations 
are not analogous. In order for a contempt proceeding to be 
analogous to a habeas or 2255 proceeding, there would have to be a 
judgment of contempt already entered against the defendant, which 
was then attacked in a subsequent proceeding on the basis of some 
infirmity or irregularity. Obviously, if the judge who found the 
defendant in contempt and sentenced him were then to rule upon 
the validity of his own sentence, the review would be considered 
inadequate; 243 indeed, no such procedure exists in the law of 
237376 U.S. 575 (1964). 
238/d. at 583. 
239337 F.2d 49, 51 n.4 (1964). 
240376 U.S. 575. 
241 United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d at 51 n.4. 
242The law of contempt has had a long and checkered history of its own; its problems 
should not be imposed upon habeas corpus. For a discussion of the problems and abuses of 
contempt, see Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal 
Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts -A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. 
REV. 1010 (1924); Harper and Haber, Lawyer Troubles in Political Trials, 60 YALE L.J. I, 
46-53 (1951); Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 956 
(1931); Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication, 28 CoLUM. L. REV. 401, 425 (1928). 
243Review of contempt proceedings is by appeal. 28 U .S.C. § 47 (1970) prohibits a trial 
judge from sitting as an appellate judge to review decisions which he entered while sitting as 
a trial judge. 
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contempt, nor has any such procedure ever been considered or 
approved. 
Second, the apparent analogy that judges in both contempt and 
habeas proceedings use their past personal observations in order to 
decide issues of fact in the subsequent proceeding does not hold in 
light of the differing functions served by the two proceedings. A 
contempt proceeding is an attempt to impose the court's immediate 
authority and power to conduct its business unobstructed by out-
bursts or intimidation, and to punish for any such interference. 244 
It is not a review of a final judgment, and does not purport to insure 
the validity of prior court rulings as does habeas corpus. Since it is 
the trial judge's immediate authority which is in jeopardy, it is' 
presumed that the same judge will enforce his right to control the 
conduct of his court, 245 unless he is otherwise disqualified. 246 In 
contrast, habeas corpus presents no issue that requires the trial 
judge to act immediately. Rather, it is the trial judge's conduct or 
rulings that at some later time are called into question, and there is 
no reason to presume that the same judge may insure the integrity 
of that proceeding better than any other judge. 
Third, there are seemingly better checks upon the accuracy of 
the personal observations made by a judge presiding over contempt 
proceedings. Contempt involves personal observations of the court 
upon which it acts immediately by giving instructions and warn-
ings, calling for a recess, or removing persons from the court, and 
ultimately charging one with contempt. The behavior charged as 
contemptuous is thus made a matter of record in the first proceed-
ing contemporaneously with the observation. The 2255 judge's 
personal observations, on the other hand, are not challenged im-
mediately; attention is not drawn to the behavior that may consti-
tute a ground for a later motion to vacate. Thus, the judge's 
observations are not made a part of the record in the prior proceed-
ing, and there is therefore no certitude that the judge's observa-
tions are accurate when later recalled. Additionally, in contempt 
proceedings, even where personal observations of the judge are 
reserved and introduced at a later hearing, the judge is aware that 
the incident will result in a hearing. He will schedule the hearing 
promptly at the close of the main trial, and he will set forth the 
244S ee Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 
517, 534 (1925). 
245See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463 (1971), where the Court said that the 
outbursts which took place entitled the trial judge to use a variety of weapons to keep order 
in his courtroom, but that in the instant case, the outbursts so "vilified" the judge that due 
process required a hearing before a different judge. Id. at 465, 466. 
246See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 
(1955); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. II (1954). 
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specific acts considered contemptuous in written specifications,247 
giving notice of the pending hearing to defendant. 248 It is the judge 
who takes the initiative in deciding to proceed on contempt, and 
who, having made the charge of contempt, is thus likely to keep the 
incident fresh in his mind. Habeas corpus, on the other hand, may 
be brought at any time,249 not at the judge's instance, but at the 
petitioner's. The motion may concern any number of issues that 
the court may or may not have considered at one time or another. 
Thus, there is less likelihood that the judge will keep all possible 
issues and all past occurrences in all the criminal proceedings 
conducted before him fresh in his mind in anticipation of some later 
hearing. 
Since the contempt and habeas procedures are so distinct, it may 
therefore be concluded that the law of contempt should not glibly 
be applied to the law of habeas corpus. 
B. Nemo Debet Esse Judex in Propria Causa 
The maxim that no man ought to be the judge of his own cause is 
fundamental to the notion of due process of law. Where one has a 
financial interest in a matter, it becomes his own cause;-250 due 
process requires that where a judge has even a de minimis financial 
interest in a matter being litigated before him he must recuse. 251 
While some have urged that the definition of "cause" or "interest" 
should be limited solely to financial matters, 252 it is obvious that 
judges have many interests that may affect the objectivity of their 
judgments, and the Supreme Court has not so limited the defini-
tion. 253 Thus, one's own cause may be emotional as well as finan-
cial.254 When ajudge becomes "personally embroiled" in a matter 
that initially was not his own, it becomes his cause, requiring 
recusation. 255 Moreover, where a judge does not actually make a 
cause his own, but it appears to be his, recusation may also be 
required. This is generally grounded upon a notion of propriety. 256 
241See Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a) & (b). 
248See Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b). 
249See 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the relevant part set out at note 79 supra. 
250See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 
(1927). 
251See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. at 60 (even when there was "nQ direct 
sharing" in funds, there was a "possible temptation" to be partial). 
•••see In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 142 (1955) (dissenting opinion). 
253/d. at 136-39. 
254See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 600 (1964) (dissenting opinion). 
250See Offutt v.·United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 
(1925). 
256See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. at 14. 
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Some relationships create such an appearance of impropriety 
that due process requires recusation. For example, the Supreme 
Court held in the case of In re Murchison 251 that due process 
requires recusation even in contempt proceedings (where recusa-
tion is not normally required) when there is a conflict of interest in 
the roles the judge performs in the adjudicatory process·. 258 
The Court in Murchison reviewed a Michigan statute which 
provided that any judge of a Michigan court of record may act as a 
"one-man grand jury" to take evidence in secret concerning sus-
pected crimes. The Court held that it violated due process for the 
judge, who first presided as the grand jury and charged defendant 
with contempt, to preside over the required public trial on the 
contempt charge. 259 
The Murchison opinion reflects a multifaceted rationale involv-
ing the notion of interest, 260 the appearance of propriety, 261 and the 
right to examine and cross-examine witnesses. 262 The Court, rely-
ing heavily upon the notion of "interest" and upon the case of 
Tumey v. Ohio, 263 commented that "[i]t would be very strange if 
our system of law permitted a judge to act as a grand jury and then 
try the very persons accused as a result of his investigations. " 264 
By the very nature of the procedure, the judge would not be 
considered a "wholly disinterested" party. 265 Of particular impor-
tance to the Court was the high probability that the trial judge's 
recollections of the grand jury proceeding would "weigh far more 
heavily with him" than the testimony in the subsequent open 
hearing. 266 The Court reasoned that it would be difficult for a judge 
to free himself from the influence of the grand jury proceedings, 267 
and said: 
251349 U.S. 133 (1955). 
2581d. at 138-39. 
2591d. at 139. 
2601d. at 136, citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). 
261ld., citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. II, 14 (1954). 
2621d. at 138-39. 
263273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
2641n re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137. 
2••1d. 
2661d. at 138. 
2671d. The Court then quoted from the trial judge's findings as an example of the judge's 
lack of objectivity: 
[T]here is one thing the record does not show, and that was [defendant's] attitude, 
and I must say that his attitude was almost insolent in the manner in which he 
answered questions and his attitude upon the witness stand .... Not only was the 
personal attitude insolent, but it was defiant, and I want to put that on the record. 
Id. In response to defense counsel's request that this comment be stricken from the record 
since it was not contained in the original record, the judge continued, "That is something 
... _that wouldn't appear on the record, bu_t it would be very evident to the court." Id. 
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Thus the judge whom due process requires to be impartial in 
weighing the evidence presented before him, called on his own 
personal knowledge and impression of what had occurred in the 
grand jury room and his judgment was based in part on this 
impression, the accuracy of which could not be tested by 
adequate cross-examination. 268 
81 
Of course, one of the factors in the Court's determination that 
the procedure was inappropriate under due process standards was 
the secrecy of the first proceeding;269 there were thus no public 
witnesses to give "disinterested" testimony. 270 But also impor-
tant, and given the greater consideration, was the fact that the 
judge was a "very material witness" 271 in the contempt proceed-
ing. Thus, the Court concluded: 
[T]he result would be either that the defendant must be de-
prived of examining or cross-examining [the judge] or else there 
would be the spectacle of the trial judge presenting testimony 
upon which he must finally pass in determining the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant. In either event the State would 
have the benefit of the judge's personal knowledge while the 
accused would be denied an effective oppportunity to cross-
examine. The right of a defendant to examine and cross-
examine witnesses is too essential to a fair trial to have that 
right jeopardized in such way. 272 
Not unlike the judicial procedure condemned by the Supreme 
Court in Murchison, rule 4(a) creates conflicting roles to be per-
formed by the 2255 judge by placing him in the position of being 
both a witness to past events and a judge deciding the truth con-
cerning those past events. Rule 4(a) therefore does not provide a 
procedure that imparts an appearance of propriety; it provides no 
checks upon the accuracy of the court's past recollections; it 
provides no opportunity for the petitioner to examine or cross-
examine the witnesses against him; it permits the court to be a 
"material witness" in a proceeding upon which it must pass judg-
ment; and it places the court in a position of weighing more heavily 
its past recollections than the testimony in the proceeding before it. 
Thus, rule 4(a) does not satisfy the due process standards estab-
lished for judges by the Supreme Court in Tumey and Murchison. 
2a•1d. 
2a•1d. 
270/d. The court stated, "If there had been [public witnesses], thc;y might have been able to 
refute the judge's statement .... " 
2111d. 
212/d. at 139. 
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V. SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT BY VARIANCE 
OF ITS PROCEDURE 
A. The Real Party in Interest 
It has long been said that habeas corpus is an independent civil 
remedy brought by a detained. person to assert his right to personal 
liberty, to inquire not into the criminal act for which he is detained, 
but into his right to liberty notwithstanding that act. 273 Upon an 
allegation of unlawful detention, a court having jurisdiction to issue 
the writ would order the jailor to deliver the body of petitioner 
before the court and show cause why the prisoner was being 
detained. 274 It is significant that the writ issued from a superior 
court to inquire into the exercise of jurisdiction by an inferior 
court, 275 so the habeas corpus review was traditionally conducted 
by a judge who had no prior knowledge or connection with the 
court whose judgment was under attack. Moreover, from the time 
of its development as a means of challenging the validity of deten-
tion until very recently, habeas corpus was used to challenge 
detention prior to trial, rather than after trial.2 76 Thus, demonstra-
tion to the habeas court that petitioner was detained by the final 
judgment of another court was sufficient cause to dismiss the 
petition, unless it could also be shown that the inferior court had 
entered the judgment without jurisdiction to do so. 277 The real 
party in interest in pretrial habeas proceedings was the jailor whose 
right to custody was at issue; the real party in interest where final 
judgment was pleaded as cause for detention was the inferior court 
whose power to enter the judgment was being challenged. 
In contrast, the American habeas remedy has evolved into an 
essentially post-trial remedy, 278 calling into question more than the 
simple custody of the jailor or the power of an inferior court to try 
the petitioner. The issues subject to challenge include the criminal 
273See Riddle v: Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1923); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 494 
(1885); Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883). 
274See Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa-The. Emergence of the Modern Writ-I, 18 
CAN. B. REV. 10, 12-13 (1940). 
275See Id. at 14 which states "[T]he corpus cum causa was itself employed to defeat 
causes in inferior courts." See also Cohen, Some Considerations on the Origins of Habeas 
Corpus, 16 CAN. 8. REV. 92, 112 (1938); R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS,§ 8, at 4-5, 7 
(2d ed. 1%9). 
276See Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 244-45 
(1965). . 
271See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830). 
278See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 59, 59 n. 13 (1968). See also, Oaks, supra not~ 276, at 
245. 
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court's conduct and rulings prior to, during, and after trial that 
have arguably deprived petitioner of some constitutional right. 279 
The habeas remedy thus places the acts of the criminal trial judge 
at the very center of the inquiry, making him the real party in 
interest. And even though the jailor (the Government) is named on 
a motion to vacate sentence, it is but a nominal party, because its 
detention of petitioner is by order of the criminal trial judge. To say 
that this same judge will issue an order to show cause why 
petitioner is being detained seems absurd. If anyone knows, it must 
certainly be the judge who ordered petitioner detained. 
Despite the long tradition that a different judge eonduct the 
habeas review, it has more recently been suggested that the trial 
judge ought to be.given the first opportunity to pass upon a motion 
attacking the validity of his sentence, just as he is given first 
opportunity to pass upon a motion to recuse for bias or pre-
judice. 280 On motion to recuse for bias or prejudice, however, the 
trial judge must accept the facts alleged in the affidavit of bias as 
true,281 and then simply rule on the legal sufficiency of the af-
fidavit. 282 In contrast, review on habeas corpus (or on a motion to 
vacate) involves the exercise of a vast array of discretionary pow-
ers, frequently involves factfinding, and may require the criminal 
trial judge to participate as a witness to the matter being chal-
lenged. Factfinding and the exercise of discretionary powers are 
subject to limited appellate review, 283 whereas the legal sufficiency 
of an affidavit of bias is fully subject to appellate review. 
One might also consider collateral review to be analogous to the 
trial judge's first opportunity to rule upon trial errors by some 
post-trial motion, such as a motion for a new trial, a motion in 
arrest of judgment, or a motion to correct or reduce sentence. This 
analogy would be sound if habeas corpu~ (or a motion to vacate) 
functioned simply to permit the trial judge to correct his own trial 
errors. But if this is the purpose of habeas corpus, then it is 
redundant, adding nothing to the procedures already available for 
review by post-trial motions except to avoid the time limitations 
imposed upon them. 
279See 28 u.s.c. §§ 2241 & 2255 (1970). 
280See Note, Processing A Motion Attacking Sentence Under Section 2255 Of The 
Judicial Code, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 788, 801 (1963). 
281 See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921); Tynan v. United States, 376 F.2d 
761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 
794, 797 (2d Cir. 1966); Simmons v. United States, 302 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1962); Mitchell v. 
United States, 126 F.2d 550, 552 (10th Cir. 1942). 
••·•see Tynan v. United States, 376 F."2d 761, 764(D.C. Cir. 196'7),cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
845 (1967); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1942); Simmons v. United States, 
'302 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1962); Mitchell v. United States, 126 F.2d 550,552 (10th Cir. 1942). 
283See notes 120-21 and accompanying text supra. 
84 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:44 
In Townsend v. Sain, 284 the Supreme Court asserted that habeas 
corpus "is to test by way of an original civil proceeding, indepen-
dent of the normal channels of review of criminal judgments,'' the 
validity of the incarceration.285 In Kaufman v. United States, 286 
the Court reiterated the function of habeas corpus as stated in 
Townsend adding that "the availability of collateral remedies is 
necessary to insure the integrity of proceedings at and before trial 
where constitutional rights are at stake. " 287 What does it mean to 
say that habeas corpus is different from direct appeal in a criminal 
proceeding? Or that it is an independent review? Or that it exists to 
insure the integrity of the criminal proceeding? Surely the criminal 
trial judge, having heard testimony and being, perhaps, convinced 
of petitioner's guilt, will find it difficult to view the 2255 petition 
without taking the fact of guilt into consideration. The court may 
consider itself a protector of the criminal judgment, thereby de-
stroying the objective and independent qualities anticipated in 
habeas corpus review. Thus, where the criminal trial judge, by his 
rulings, becomes the real party in interest, he should not preside 
over the collateral review challenging the validity of those rulings. 
B. Procedural Character of the Writ 
Artice I, § 9 of the United States Constitution, by providing that 
"[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended .... , " asserts that there is some protected privilege that 
cannot be taken away. Presumably, the privilege of the writ was so 
well known to the framers of the Constitution that they saw no 
need to define it; it was later deemed sufficient to "resort ... to 
the common law" to determine the meaning and extent of habeas 
corpus. 288 
Examination of common law notions of the writ of habeas corpus 
cum causa reveal that by the fourteenth century the writ issued to 
order the body of the one detained to be brought before the 
court, 289 and to require the custodian to declare by what authority 
he detained the prisoner. 290 This review by habeas corpus included 
the power to release the prisoner whenever the jail or's justification 
was legally insufficient. 291 The definition of legal sufficiency has, 
284372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
285/d. at 311-12. 
286394 U.S. 217 (1969). 
287/d. at 225. 
288Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807). 
289See Cohen, supra note 274. 
290/d. at 13. 
291/d. at 19-20. 
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of course, fluctuated over the centuries, but the unique and simple 
procedure by which one court reviewed the validity of another 
court's power (or the jailor's power) to imprison a person has made 
the writ of habeas corpus a time-honored symbol of freedom. It has 
been lauded and esteemed as the "great writ, " 292 as the "best and 
only sufficient defense of personal freedom," 293 and as the "prin-
cipal bulwark of English liberty. " 294 It may be presumed that it 
would not have been worthy of inclusion in the United States 
Constitution were it not valued both as a symbol and as an effective 
remedy for the protection of individual liberty. 
Preservation of the privilege of the writ requires more than 
protecting the right to raise the same substantive issues by motion 
to vacate as were available by habeas corpus. The substantive 
issues cognizable by habeas corpus merely determine the occa-
sions upon which habeas corpus may be invoked. Habeas corpus is 
essentially "a procedural device" ;295 it is thus irrelevant that the 
meaning of' 'validity'' of incarceration has changed since the four-
teenth century. The underlying function of the habeas remedy has 
remained the same: to challenge the exercise of power denying a 
person his liberty. 296 Preservation of the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus necessarily requires the protection of this basic 
procedural character. 
Section 2255, like habeas corpus, is supposed to provide a re-
view of the criminal trial judge's rulings on jurisdictionai and con-
stitutional issues and the adequacy of his factfinding upon which 
those rulings are based. Section 2255 is considered the equivc1lent 
of habeas corpus, and is the substituted remedy for federal prison-
ers to the privilege of habeas corpus preserved by the Constitu-
tion. 297 . 
In Judge Stone's statement of purpose to Congress, he asserted 
that section 2255 was "in the nature of, but much broader than, 
co ram no bis .... As a remedy, it is intended to be as broad as 
292See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868). 
293/d. at 95. See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (concurring opinion). 
294See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 512 (concurring opinion). 
295Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968). See D. MEADOR, HABEAS CoRPUS AND 
MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF POWER AND LIBERTY 19 (1966). 
296See Cohen, supra note 274, at 12-13: 
It will be remembered that the earliest writs of habeas corpus ... had only a 
single purpose in view, to have a desired party before the court. As yet there was 
nothing to suggest that the cause of the arrest or detention be given to the courts 
Habeas corpus cum causa ... may have made its appearance in the first years of 
the 14th century .... The significance of this wording is two-fold; it presumes that 
there is detention, and it asserts the court's right to inquire into the case .... 
See also R. SOKOL, supra note 275; Cohen, supra note 275; Jenks, supra note 24. 
291See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,217,219 (1952). Accord, Hill v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962). 
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habeas corpus. " 298 A reasonable construction of this statement is 
that the remedy of habeas corpus should be provided in a more 
convenient forum, that is, where the records, files, and witnesses 
are located, or in the jurisdiction where the criminal judgment was 
rendered; the Supreme Court has so construed the statute in 
United States v. Hayman. 299 The Court thought that no constitu-
tional question of suspension of the writ was raised by section 2255 
because the Court deemed the statutory provision to be a complete 
and effective substitute for habeas corpus, providing "the same 
rights in another and more convenient forum. " 300 
Section 2255 has nevertheless been considered a "hybrid" re-
medy, 301 incorporating not only the notions of the writ of habeas 
corpus, but also the notions of the writ of error coram nobis. 302 
Coram nobis and remedies in the nature of the ancient writ of error 
coram nobis provide a form of self-review to permit the court that 
entered judgment to correct its own errors. 303 Historically, the 
review seems to have been limited and technical, correcting mat-
ters not known to the judge at the time of entry of the judgment, 
and correcting clerical errors of the record. 304 No question of the 
judge's fairness was at issue, nor was the judge considered to have 
been in error by rendering his first judgment. With respect to such 
technical matters, self-review seems adequate. 
Habeas corpus, however, was never a form of self-review as was 
coram nobis; review was by some independent authority. Had 
habeas corpus procedure ever required the petitioner to go to the 
jailor to plead the jailor's error in incarcerating him, or to go to the 
criminal trial judge to plead that the judge's exercise of power was 
beyond his jurisdiction, the writ of habeas corpus would certainly 
have fallen into oblivion. It is the requirement of accountability by 
the jailor or by the court for taking away a person's liberty that has 
298342 U.S. at 216-17. 
299342 u .s. 205 (1952). 
300Jd. at 219 (emphasis added). 
301S ee Martin v. United States, 273 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 
853 (1961). 
302/d. at 776-78. 
303See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), where the Supreme Court discussed 
the nature of the writ of error coram nobis, quoting a commentator as follows: 
If a judgment in the King's Bench be erroneous in matter of fact only, and not in 
point of law, it may be reversed and in the same court, by writ of error co ram nob is 
.... [F]or error in fact is not error of the judges, and. reversing it is not reversing 
their own judgment. So, upon a judgment in the King's Bench, if there be error in 
the process, or through the default of the clerks, it may be reversed in the same 
court, by writ of error coram nobis .... 
See also, Bums v. United States, 321 F.2d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 
959 (1963); Lipscomb v. United States, 273 F.2d 860, 865 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 
U.S. 836 (1960). 
304See Lamb v. State, 91 Fla. 396,401, 107 So. 535,537 (1926); Rhodes v. State, 199 Ind. 
183, 192, 156 N.E. 389, 392 (1927). 
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made the writ great. Self-review is simply not enough to protect 
that constitutional privilege. 
The independence of the habeas proceeding from the prior crim-
inal proceedings305 and the irrelevance of the question of guilt to 
the issues raised by the writ306 have long been considered essential 
to the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. To the extent that the 
presiding judge permits the criminal proceeding to control his im-
pressions of the habeas petition or his analysis of the issues raised, 
the petitioner's right to the independent civil proceeding con-
templated by the writ of habeas corpus is jeopardized. 
Rule 4(a) is obviously more than procedural; it provides a drastic 
substantive change in the concept of habeas corpus. The rule 
substitutes the notion of coram nobis review (a form of self-review) 
for habeas corpus review, traditionally a review of one court by 
another. In so doing, the rule effectively destroys the traditional 
notions attached to habeas review. 
Ultimately, there must be some point at which the variance in 
procedure causes section 2255 no longer to reflect the habeas 
remedy. To the extent that section 2255 is an incomplete substitute 
for habeas corpus, its exclusive use thereby effectively suspends 
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for federal prisoners. 
CONCLUSION 
Beneath all the efforts of the federal judiciary to revise the 
habeas procedures and to regulate the great volume of post-
conviction petitions brought by state and federal prisoners lies a 
sense of frustration. As Mr. Justice Jackson wrote in Brown v. 
Allen:307 "It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application 
to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a 
haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the 
needle is not worth the search.'' 
The adoption of rule 4(a) reflects an attitude that petitions are 
bound to be false, frivolous, and abusive of the collateral process, 
and that review must therefore be limited and tightly controlled by 
the criminal trial judge to inhibit abuses and avoid the "unseemli-
305See.Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217,224 (1969); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 
293, 311-12 (1963); Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1923). 
306See Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883). 8111 see Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 
3037, 3050 (1976). 
3o7344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J ., concurring). 
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ness" of that judge's work product being reviewed by another 
judge. Rule 4(a) imposes upon federal districtjudges the responsi-
bility of holding evidentiary hearings to develop sufficient facts to 
permit them to determine the correctness of their own prior rul-
ings. Where the judge interjects his own recollections into the 
hearing, he inevitably provides facts upon which he may then rule. 
Rule 4(a) thus permits the judge to create his own record to demon-
strate the validity, integrity, and fairness of his own prior rulings. 
It has been argued that section 455 is applicable to 2255 proceed-
ings, and requires the judge to recuse where he is to be a formal 
witness.308 Necessarily, it is as crucial to the appearance of justice 
that the judge not be permitted to act as an informal witness, 
avoiding the recusation requirement simply by not formally taking 
the witness stand. Permitting the court to proceed in this manner 
effectively destroys the objective and impartial review anticipated 
by both due process of law, and the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus. Review by motion to vacate must be effective and fair in 
appearance as well as in fact. A meritorious petition is clearly · 
worth the search. The search should therefore be adequate to 
discover it: 
· 
308See notes 224-36 and accompanying text supra. 

